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Abstract 
For refugees that have been resettled into hostland nations, the creation of formal refugee 
community organizations (RCOs) dedicated to assisting immigrants represents a grassroots 
response to the stresses of migration. Despite their importance to the lives of refugees, RCOs 
have received little scholarly attention in the United States. Even less attention has been 
dedicated to studying the role of RCOs for African peoples. This research seeks to address these 
gaps in scholarship by analyzing community understandings of one RCO, the Congolese 
Development Center, among the Congolese refugee community located in the North Shore 
region of Massachusetts. Using qualitative ethnographic data, this research interrogates the 
interface between the organizational behaviors of the community and the societal structures that 
impact social organization, including global capitalism, systemic racism, heteropatriarchy, and 
neoliberal governance pressures. My findings suggest that these systems of marginalization and 
oppression fragment communities and exert pressure on the individuals and organizations at the 
bottom of the resettlement chain, replicating inequalities and limiting the ability of refugee 
communities to address the problems they face. 
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On the streets of Lynn, Massachusetts, a city first settled by European colonizers in the 
early 1600s, an American history is being rewritten by the city’s many newcomers. Corner stores 
have become bodegas, church signs announce service times in Khmer, and dozens of languages 
are spoken on the sidewalks. Today, more than a third of Lynn’s residents were born outside of 
the United States (US), the country that Lynn predates (US Census Bureau 2016). It is a city with 
a rust belt tightened to its last notch, full of concrete-colored contradictions. The relative 
affordability and proximity to Boston attracts both low-income immigrants and a gentrifying 
middle-class. Rusting factories of the past compete with the sleek luxury apartments of the future 
for the right to preside over the city. It is here, within this distinctly American city in transition, 
that a large community of Congolese refugees, and a grassroots organization dedicated to helping 
them, can be found. 
The Congolese Development Center (CDC) is a refugee community organization (RCO) 
that offers direct service provision to recently-arrived Congolese refugees. While resettlement 
agencies are tasked with the initial reception and placement of refugees, post-resettlement 
organizations like the CDC offer services several months after the arrival of refugees, once the 
resettlement agency’s mandate of service provision expires. As an ethnic community-based 
organization (ECBO), the leadership of the CDC comes from the same ethnic background as the 
community it exists to serve. 
Despite their importance to the lives of refugees, RCOs have received little scholarly 
attention in the United States. Among the English-language literature, studies typically center 
around organizations within the United Kingdom or Canada. Even less attention has been 
dedicated to studying the role of RCOs for African peoples. My research seeks to address these 
gaps in scholarship and understanding. But any scholarly attempt to understand RCOs must 
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expand beyond the institutions themselves. The RCO sits in relation to a number of social 
networks and relational realities that comprise the social fabric of refugee life in a receiving 
nation.  
This thesis attempts to understand the organization of Congolese refugees in the North 
Shore region of Massachusetts. The North Shore, a collection of working-class to middle-class 
suburbs roughly ten miles north of Boston, has resettled a significant number of Congolese 
refugees over the past several decades. Lynn, a city of roughly 90,000 people in the North Shore 
(US Census Bureau 2016), is where the CDC is located, and served as the primary field site for 
this research. 
For an analysis of organizational patterns and behaviors, studying the Congolese 
community in the North Shore offers several benefits. First, the institution of the CDC provides a 
lens through which to view the organization of refugees. Second, the North Shore features both a 
well-established community of Congolese immigrants who arrived decades ago, and an influx of 
recently resettled refugees. I anticipated that these community dynamics would lead to a richer 
analysis of integration into both a nation-state and an extant immigrant community. Third, there 
are a number of context-specific challenges to resettlement in the North Shore, from high cost-
of-living to gentrification, that impact the lives of refugees. 
 My initial conceptions of this project were rather neat formulations that detailed the 
functions of an organization and the responses of a community to migratory stresses. The reality 
I encountered in the field, through the stories and experiences of my participants, is far more 
nuanced and gritty. Through the participants who invited me into their lives, I witnessed the toll 
exacted by ill-conceived policies implemented by well-intentioned practitioners. This thesis tells 
the story of a community struggling against a resettlement system that constrains its capacity to 
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address the challenges it faces. This story cannot be divorced from the exploitative and 
intersecting effects of larger structural forces, including global capitalism, heteropatriarchy, 
systemic and institutional racism, and the ascendency of nationalist extremism in the United 
States. All of these factors influence the ways Congolese refugees enter into American society 
and relate to one another, and serve as vital pillars for this research. 
 
Methods and Conceptual Approach 
Data for this research was collected over three months, from June to August of 2017, 
primarily through two methods: participant observation and ethnographic interviewing. The first 
month in the field was dedicated to observation. My conception of participant observation 
borrows from Dewalt and Dewalt (2011), who suggest that a researcher must actively participate 
in the culture of the community they hope to observe. To accomplish this, I embedded as an 
intern at the CDC, volunteering as an assistant case manager. Tasks associated with this role 
included accompanying clients to medical appointments, arranging for public benefit provision, 
or assisting with various problems when clients came to the office. During this time, I also 
attended informal community meetings at a Congolese Catholic church and visited the homes of 
community members. Data for this period was mostly gathered through jot notes, taken in the 
field, which I converted into field notes soon thereafter. 
Following the observational period of the first month in the field, I began scheduling and 
conducting interviews in July. To schedule interviews, I would meet with a participant, provide 
consent materials, explain the purpose of the study, and then return to ensure the respondent 
understood their role, risks, and rights. I conducted nineteen semi-structured, ethnographic 
interviews. Six of the interviews were with refugee resettlement officials, and thirteen were with 
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refugees. Interviews took between 45 minutes and 3.5 hours to complete, with most lasting 90-
120 minutes. Stylistically, I followed the grand/mini tour spiral method of questioning (Spradley 
1979), a process-based line of inquiry which helps to identify major themes before teasing out 
specifics and particularities.  
Most interviews were in English (13), with four conducted in French and two conducted 
in Swahili with the help of a translator. Four of the practitioners interviewed were women and 
two were men. Among the refugees interviewed, four were women, and nine were men. All but 
one of the male refugees were “single case refugees,” meaning they were resettled without any 
family members or dependents. Contrarily, all but one of the female refugees were resettled 
along with their families.  
A key aspect of my methodology is the practice of braiding data, scholarship, theory, and 
thought into writing. In presenting ideas, I seek to elevate the stories of respondents to 
foreground experience within my research. Central to the Black feminist thought that guides this 
project is the idea that the personal is political. Margaret Ledwith, writing about the pedagogy 
and praxis of bell hooks, notes that Black feminist pedagogy  
places everyday stories at the heart of the process of critical consciousness. The 
notion that the deeply personal is profoundly political leads to a critical 
understanding of the nature of structural oppression, and the way that we are 
shaped in all our difference by structures of power that permeate our lives. By 
exploring the political nature of everyday encounters, we move towards the 
critical consciousness necessary to demystify the dominant hegemony and to 
change oppressive structures. (Ledwith 2011: 154) 
 
bell hooks’ philosophy centers the personal, subjective experience as a site of knowledge 
and consciousness. The elevation of the subjective that represents a foundational tenet of Black 
feminism is at tension with the pursuit of objective reasoning that lies at the heart of social 
science. In scholarship, a balance must be struck between the dualist epistemologies that separate 
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the world into objective and subjective truths, structures and agents, and personal and political 
experiences, among many other dichotomies. Adhering to a single line of inquiry dooms any 
intellectual endeavor to failure; the most sanitized attempts at objectivity are frustrated by the 
relational perspective of the researcher, and the most veracious subjective accounts are 
discounted as idiosyncratic, irrelevant points of view. 
Rather than indulging in dichotomous thinking that leads to artificial binaries, I approach 
knowledge (and the production of knowledge that defines pedagogy) as a spectrum that 
embraces multiple claims to various truths. In addition to traditional, linear scholarly writing, I 
present experiences from the field via asides that are separate from the overarching analysis. I 
draw attention to these asides by placing them in colored boxes embedded throughout the text. 
Each of the stories framed as asides represent a rather intense emotional experience for me 
personally. They capture moments that wrenched tears or induced feelings of anxiety and 
despair. I sought to re-create not only the narratives that triggered these visceral responses, but 
also the emotional and psychological experience of the stories through creative writing, thick 
description, and bearing witness.  
With that said, I certainly do not seek to compare the experience of encountering 
traumatic stories with the very real traumas endured by my participants. It is not my intention to 
appropriate narratives of pain and hardship to redirect attention to the researcher. For precisely 
this reason, while I do include subjective claims, personal evaluations, and chart my emotions in 
these narrative insertions, I do not include myself as a “character.” The stories presented through 
narrative insertion reveal rather dramatic developments in my critical consciousness that changed 
the way I approached the topic. The personal experience of conducting research and 
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encountering stories became political in that it contributed to a process of conscientization that 
broadened my perspective.  
I believe it is important to challenge the feminist assertion that scholarship can possibly 
locate the political within the personal experiences of subjects. Narrative contains political 
power, but it is the researcher who edits, curates, and selectively presents “the personal,” 
separating it from the experiences of the narrator. If an interview is rendered in any way for 
presentation to an audience, it loses meaning, elides nuance, and, most likely, presents only those 
aspects which the author found most important or relevant. To call attention to my fingerprints 
on the narratives of respondents, I separate the asides—both temporally, through flashback style 
writing, and physically, through self-contained boxes in the body of the text—from analytical 
writing.  
The discussion of authorial authority leads to another point about my methodology. I am 
the lens through which stories are told and data is presented. As research instruments, my body 
and mind have been conditioned to experience and expect various privileges. I have been trained 
to recognize some identities that I embody, like my whiteness and my cisgender male 
presentation, as variables that affect how the world interacts with me, what participants expect of 
me, and how I am able to interpret the experiences of those who lack access to structural 
privileges. Other identities emerged as relevant to this research that I had not considered, 
including my ability to speak English, my position as an employee at the CDC, my American 
citizenship, my mobility, my ability to drive, and my educational level, among many, many 
others. I provide this list not to fulfill the penitential ideological practice of confessing to my 
privileges while providing no further account for their impact on my research. Rather, I hope to 
assert how the many privileges I embody have shaped the way I view the world, and render me 
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blind to the experience of oppression imposed upon those who occupy marginalized identities. 
This perspective pervades all aspects of my research, and must be accounted for in all 
documented exchanges, data, writing, analysis, and perspective.  
According to some Black anthropologists, the modern, positivist foundation of 
anthropology, the discipline to which my scholarship is loosely tethered, has led to a perspective 
that has historically failed to account for the ways that knowledge and its production, like 
experience, is relational. France Winddance Twine, a Black female anthropologist challenging 
the epistemological foundations of anthropology through the practice of fieldwork, writes that: 
After decades of self-reflexivity among ethnographers analyzing the practice of 
writing and conducting field research, the lack of sustained attention to racialized 
dilemmas is particularly noteworthy, considering the degree to which other axes 
of power have been theorized. (Twine 2000: 5) 
 
 I recognize that my position as a researcher intersects with my whiteness in every 
interaction and role as a producer of knowledge. Fanon provides some clue as to how embodying 
Blackness affects interactions with those who project whiteness, linking interracial behavioral 
differences to histories of oppression. 
The black man has two dimensions. One with his fellows, the other with the white 
man. A Negro behaves differently with a white man and with another Negro. That 
this self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question. 
(Fanon [1952] 2008: 8). 
 
In the context of fieldwork, the racial identity Fanon mentions intersects with other 
identities of privilege to multiply the effects of power and the historically informed experience of 
subjugation. The reality that my whiteness affects the ways Black subjects interact with me 
places demands on both audience and researcher. The audience must account for the ways my 
embodied presence, my research objectives, and my positionality influence the language used to 
give voice to experience. And as a researcher, I must critically examine each interaction as an 
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exercise in power. The silence of selective self-censorship requires as much scrutiny as the 
practice of selective self-presentation. I cannot presume to know how to fill the resulting 
silences, or where to insert my own conceptions into that which is not said.  
Silence, therefore, is a major theme in this work. Throughout scholarship on RCOs and 
refugees, silence pervades. From white scholars studying Black populations (or ignoring the 
social constructions that make these populations Black) to the dearth of literature by Black 
scholars on RCOs (or the marginalization of this work such that it is so hidden from the 
mainstream as to not exist), scholarship exists as an arena of violent epistemological struggle that 
suppresses voices or ignores the bases of oppression. Poet and Black feminist theorist Audre 
Lorde acknowledges the role of silence in her call to center the experience of Black peoples who 
embody multiple marginalized identities. 
What are the words you do not yet have? What do you need to say? What are the 
tyrannies you swallow day by day and attempt to make your own, until you will 
sicken and die of them, still in silence? Perhaps for some of you here today, I am 
the face of one of your fears. Because I am woman, because I am Black, because I 
am lesbian, because I am myself -- a Black woman warrior poet doing my work -- 
come to ask you, are you doing yours? (Lorde 1977) 
 
By elevating marginalized narratives, centering exploitative structures, and advocating 
for systemic social transformation, I hope to meet the challenge that Lorde presents.  
  
Limitations 
 One of the major limitations of this research is the relative lack of female voices among 
the refugee population. Without properly representing the female perspective, I worry that my 
analysis of the exploitative effects of heteropatriarchy is dulled. Two principal factors accounted 
for the over-representation of males in this research. First, there has been a concerted effort to 
resettle a higher number of single cases to the North Shore. According to practitioners, single 
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cases are more likely to be men. Chapter Two will examine the dynamics that lead to a 
preference for single male refugees by resettlement agencies, changing the composition of the 
community. Second, as a male researcher, it was occasionally difficult to navigate the cultural 
and patriarchal barriers that prevented me from meeting more female participants. For example, 
Patrice, a male refugee in his early 40s, would not allow me to interview his wife. He suggested 
that a conversation would upset her and he was uncomfortable connecting me with her. Since I 
had no independent relationship with Patrice’s wife from any other setting, he was able to use his 
position as a gatekeeper to prevent her participation in the study. 
A second limitation of my research is that I assumed a role of institutional authority by 
embedding as an intern at the CDC. In this capacity, I reported to the Executive Director of the 
organization and worked with refugee clients. While this provided key insights into the 
operations of the institution, I surmise that this position may have limited the data I gathered 
from participants. Despite my assurances to the contrary, there was likely fear that I might report 
any negative information to my “co-workers” at the organization, who wield a significant 
amount of power over refugees. Additionally, the organization played a key role in introducing 
me to participants. Because I was interested in interviewing clients of the CDC, the organization 
helped to connect me with refugees and arrange interviews. This expanded the universe of 
potential participants, but it also may have contributed to an unspoken power dynamic that 
identified me with the CDC. As I began writing, I also recognized that I might have become 
dependent on the organization in ways that may impact my ability to critically assess it.  
Third, as noted above, my positionality limits this research. As someone who lacks the 
experiential knowledge of Blackness, femaleness, lack of US citizenship, and an inability to 
communicate in a nation’s dominant language, I can only speak with borrowed authority on the 
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power of these social constructs and realities. In addition to affecting the way I collect and 
analyze information, my whiteness was interpreted by the community in ways I did not expect. 
My supervisor lightheartedly alerted me to the fact that, as a white American with language skills 
in French and Swahili, I was arousing suspicion. One client, who refused to work with me, 
insisted that I was working on behalf of the governments of the US or Rwanda (framed as the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’s regional rival), keeping tabs on the refugee population in 
the United States. Another swore that he saw me in the refugee camps of Goma during the First 
Congolese War in 1997. If so, that story would certainly surprise me (and my mother would have 
to justify voluntarily bringing her toddler to an explosive war zone in central Africa). While 
these stories were somewhat amusing, they also forced me to consider ways in which my 
positionality as a white American researcher limited my understanding in ways that are both 
obvious and obscured. How many more refugees would have been willing to speak with me if 
my body was not such a strong symbol for structural power and access? 
The final limitation I wish to acknowledge is my inability to communicate with 
respondents in the language that they feel most comfortable expressing themselves. By asking 
that respondents speak in English or French, I prioritized my ability to understand over the 
refugees’ ability to express. Even the compromise of using a translator refracts language through 
another lens, distancing the account I heard from that the respondent wished to express. Meaning 
erodes at the interface of thought and language, and I suspect that my inability to communicate 
in the primary language of many respondents detracted from the articulations of their 
experiences. 
 
Overview 
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Chapter One positions the RCO as an object of study in the academy, setting the 
theoretical foundation for an analysis of the CDC. In examining the dominant approaches that 
have solidified RCOs in the intellectual imagination, I interrogate and reposition three trends. 
First, studies of RCOs atomize and isolate the organizations from global structures that shape 
their functions and behaviors. This tendency prevents an analysis of structural forces, including 
those resulting from the overlapping effects of global capitalism with transnational racism and 
heteropatriarchy, from entering into conversation with the study of RCOs. Second, a 
Tocquevillian conception of civil society, which positions civil and associational society as an 
arena of resistance against tyrannical state power, obscures cooperation between RCOs and the 
state. By establishing a mean between Tocqueville’s formulation of civil society and Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony, the RCO is situated as a space of both resistance to and compliance with 
state objectives. Third, the legacy of Durkheimian functionalism dominates scholarship on 
RCOs, as organizations are reduced to idealistic models of services they provide. Functionalist 
approaches both limit understanding of RCOs with a narrow focus on services, and privilege the 
codes of understandings of researchers over those of the communities they serve. Functionalism 
obscures barriers to access that complicate access to institutional function, creating vertical 
relations that strip refugees and practitioners of agency. Subjecting the existing intellectual tools 
to critical scrutiny establishes a framework that guides my approach to the study of community 
organizational patterns. 
 Chapter Two examines the effects of neoliberal resettlement policies on the composition 
of and service provision to the North Shore Congolese refugee community. A privatized 
resettlement system that emphasizes competition, low public expenditure, and employment leads 
resettlement agencies to resettle more single case refugees, many of whom are male. The 
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preference for single male cases is communicated to refugees in the pre-resettlement process, 
changing decision-making and leading some to misrepresent their familial status. Arriving 
without familial kinship networks subjects refugees to the stresses of isolation and social 
fragmentation. The Congolese family becomes the unspoken target of policies that reduce 
refugees to their economic utility and necessities. 
 The failures of neoliberal resettlement policy are pushed down the chain for post-
resettlement agencies like the CDC to correct. Chapter Three examines understandings of service 
provision and sociocultural roles of the organization within the community. The CDC, adapting 
to a national climate that is increasingly hostile to refugees, must navigate racialized policies that 
act as barriers to public resources for Black peoples. The community overwhelmingly approves 
of the CDC as a service provider, framing their cultural competency in opposition to services 
provided by the resettlement agencies. The organization, however, fails to account for or address 
the social isolation that is a predictable result of the economic fundamentalism that pervades 
refugee resettlement.  
 Finally, the conclusion calls for changes to the failed resettlement system that transfers 
stresses to those least able to cope with them. As a crucible of neoliberal governance, refugee 
resettlement presents, in stark relief, the dangers of economic fundamentalism, the inequality of 
an ethic of market competition, and the destruction of social bonds that link human beings. 
Reimagining refugee resettlement requires reimagining society, locating true empowerment in 
the redistribution of unequally allocated (and unethically attained) resources while centering the 
dignity of human beings in the social fabric we interrogate, deconstruct, and remake. 
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Chapter 1 
“I see beyond the welcome”: 
Repositioning the RCO in literature and theory 
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“This is the slowest elevator in the world,” said the program director of the Congolese 
Development Center, Viviane Kamba, in her syrupy French accent. She leaned against the rear 
corner of the elevator with her eyes fixed on circular lights that indicated the current floor of this 
old building. It seemed like the type of structure that had lived many lives, with faded linoleum 
floors and weathered brick walls that struggled against the gravity of time. We passed the second 
level, which hosted a small manufacturing line, and the third level, where a charter school 
teemed with noisy students, before the doors creaked open to reveal sterile, if faded, white 
cinderblock walls dulled by humming fluorescent lights. We had arrived at the New American 
Center. 
The New American Center is a coalition of seven migrant community organizations, 
often called ethnic community-based organizations (ECBOs), that support the integration 
outcomes of certain newcomer populations. A host of national and ethnic identities have their 
own organizations, from legacy immigrant ethnicities like Russians and Bosnians, whose 
numbers peaked in preceding decades and have declined in recent years, to populations like the 
Sudanese and Somalis, whose numbers have recently been climbing steadily or suddenly 
upward. Occupying two windowless offices in this space is the Congolese Development Center 
(CDC). Since its founding in 2003, the CDC has served Congolese migrants who now call 
Boston’s sprawling and gritty northern suburbs home. Over the years, the organization has 
covered a large swath of territory, spanning from Chelsea (just north of Boston) to Worcester 
(roughly an hour by car to the west). Today, operations are concentrated in Lynn, with informal 
and loosely organized satellite operations in Lowell and Worcester. 
The CDC in Lynn has two employees. Viviane works part-time with the organization, 
balancing another job when she is not working with clients. She has a resonant, vibrant laugh 
   
 
 
 
 
16 
that sits just beneath the surface of her professional comportment, always one story away from 
dissolving her into a wide grin and a protesting hand that unsuccessfully attempts to suppress her 
giggles. A lifetime of service to vulnerable populations has taught her that most things eventually 
work out favorably, if you take a long enough time horizon, and that humor is occasionally a 
necessary ingredient in the difficult work of human service. But Viviane’s levity does not 
compromise her commitment to her clients or the seriousness with which she approaches social 
work. The demands on her time are intense. More than once when I was in the field, she called 
from her lunch break to conference in with a doctor via sketchy speakerphone, translating 
complicated medical diagnoses to clients and asking tough questions of medical professionals. 
She was born in Congo to a father who soon took her to France, where she spent much of her life 
before coming to the US. Now, having found stability here, she devotes her time to helping 
recently arrived refugees. 
The CDC is run by Eric Kamba, Viviane’s husband and the Executive Director of the 
organization. He is the only permanent, full-time employee. If he cannot be found in his office, 
with papers sprawled on his oversized desk and one or two refugees sitting across from him, he 
is typically in the field, responding to various crises, ensuring clients make their medical 
appointments, or assisting with public benefit issues. A half-fastened, untucked, short-sleeved 
button-down typically drapes his large frame. His booming voice effortlessly oscillates between 
the five languages he speaks. His phone always seems to be either ringing or on speakerphone; in 
either scenario it is at top volume. In many ways, I found he reminded me of my grandfather: a 
friendly, gruff presence unafraid to occupy space, who has little interest in delicacy and little 
time for inaction.  
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The importance of ECBOs is not simply the services that they provide, but the manner in 
which they provide them. ECBOs like the CDC are expected to provide “culturally and 
linguistically appropriate care and services,” which the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) 
defines as providing services “in a manner that is compatible with a client’s linguistic and 
cultural background” (ORR 2016: 2) . Organizations like the CDC have become an increasingly 
important part of the refugee resettlement infrastructure. Within resettlement, ECBOs have taken 
on a role in “post-resettlement” service provision. To understand what is meant by the term 
“post-resettlement,” a brief (and simplified) outline of the refugee resettlement timeline, greatly 
informed by the work of Jessica Darrow (2015b), must be presented. 
A series of national and international governance agencies, from the US Department of 
State to the International Organization for Migration, select refugees from camps for resettlement 
to receiving nations (such as the United States). After refugees pass a strenuous background 
check and are determined to have met the requirements for entry into America, the governance 
agencies hold a closed-door meeting with representatives from nine National Resettlement 
Agencies (NRAs), all of which are private, non-profit organizations that have cooperative 
agreements with the government to resettle refugees. Once each NRA receives its caseload, the 
refugees are assigned to local affiliates in cities around the country. In this work, I will use either 
the term resettlement agency or the term voluntary agency (shortened to “Volag”) to refer to 
these local affiliates for convenience and clarity, though Volag is sometimes equated with NRAs 
and not their local affiliates in other literature. 
Volags then “resettle” refugees, which means situating refugees into their local hostland 
context and providing services. From the day refugees arrive, the clock determining their 
eligibility for services starts ticking. The State Department funded reception and placement 
   
 
 
 
 
18 
(R&P) services last for three months (US Department of State 2018). While there are a number 
of cash-assistance funding streams for the resettlement of refugees at the state level for 
Massachusetts, all generally end eight months after arrival (ORI 2017a). The Volag’s mandate, 
or the period of time for which the agency is responsible for the provision of services, expires at 
this point, eight months after the refugee sets foot on US soil. The expiration of the Volag’s 
mandate triggers two events. First, the Volags take on a less intensive case management role 
until 60 months after the date of arrival, monitoring the progress of these “non-priority” refugees 
while providing a very limited menu of services. Essentially, their work with the refugees is 
mostly finished. Second, the refugee is considered to be in “post-resettlement,” and is a target for 
services from ECBOs and refugee community organizations (RCOs). The CDC is one such RCO 
that provides post-resettlement services, and is the object (or perhaps the lens) of study for this 
research.  
The first challenge of studying a refugee community organization is the difficulty in 
defining the term. Some scholars point to what has been termed the “RCO paradigm” established 
by Zetter and Pearl, which defines RCOs as “organizations rooted within, and supported by, the 
ethnic or national refugee asylum seeker communities they serve. Essentially, these RCOs are 
established by the refugees and asylum seekers themselves—or by their pre-established 
communities” (Zetter and Pearl 2000: 676). According to this definition, RCOs are defined, in 
part, by the role they play for forced migrants resettled to a new hostland. Central to the 
definition of the RCO is the sense of connection and rootedness in a community. Indeed, via the 
botanical symbol of the “root,” Zetter and Pearl implicitly state that the RCO channels strength 
and vitality from the community. But these criteria alone are clearly too broad to form the basis 
of a sustained analysis; any definition that draws no distinctions between a refugee soccer 
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league, a refugee church, or a refugee social service organization requires refinement. In keeping 
with the spirit intended by the quote, I borrow a definition from Griffiths, Sigona, and Zetter 
which positions migrant associations as “modes of adaptation to new social relationships and 
norms” (2005: 13), applying only to formal social service organizations with the express 
objective of assisting with the (post-)resettlement of refugees.  
This narrow definition of RCOs applies to organizations that connect refugees to 
resources, develop the socioeconomic capacity of the community, and offer direct services to 
refugees. Like Zetter and Pearl, I echo the importance of the RCO being of and based in the 
community. But just as the proximity to and relationship with an ethnic community is key to the 
definition of the RCO, the position of the RCO within a global economic, social, and institutional 
ecosystem is key to understanding its significance.  
Before I offer my research and conclusions on the CDC as an RCO and its impact on the 
community, it is necessary to explore the existing literature and research that shaped this project. 
Despite the diversity of RCOs, the research on these organizations to date is surprisingly 
monolithic. Interrogating the theoretical foundations of the study of RCOs helps to explain the 
relative uniformity that researchers have applied to the study of these organizations. Findings and 
approaches tend to cluster around some combination of three overarching themes: 
1. There is a tendency of scholarship to atomize and isolate individual refugee 
organizations (or similarly grouped organizations) in terms of receiving nation, ethnic 
community group, or social/cultural function. While such isolation is necessary for 
specificity and detailed nuance (and is, in some ways, replicated in this research as 
well), the result has been to quarantine RCOs from a holistic perspective that 
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acknowledges global structures, including the intersecting effects of transnational 
racism, global neoliberal capitalism, and patriarchal pressures. 
2. Research tends to examine RCOs as an element within a larger civil society, 
according to the Tocquevillian definition. The emphasis here is on the mediating role 
such organizations play between the refugee population and the state, and the 
competition between the functions of the state and of free associations like RCOs. 
3. Research on RCOs derives from a Durkheimian functionalist tradition that takes a 
utilitarian, transactional view of the roles of RCOs. Researchers impose their 
understanding of function upon the institutions they study, which obscures barriers to 
access and limits the agency of refugees in the studies. 
The inherited intellectual tools that ground this study have yielded important and 
necessary contributions to the study of RCOs. Yet in order to fully and richly investigate the 
importance of the refugee community organization, the epistemological context must be 
examined, evaluated, and improved.  
 This chapter will examine the ways research on refugee community organizations has 
reflexively shaped the ways such organizations are understood, both within academia and in the 
realm of public policy. In testing the intellectual foundations, gaps and silences will emerge that 
undermine the researcher’s ability to arrive at a full understanding of RCOs. As limitations in 
scholarship are addressed and a new perspective is created, the emergent theoretical tools will be 
applied to the Congolese Development Center via qualitative data gathered from this institutional 
and community-based ethnography, situating the organization within a broader ideological 
environment. 
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Centering Global Capitalism and Race 
With a casual, almost sleepy frankness, Frederic presented his acidic analysis 
of American destabilization of the global south. After he told me that “le capitalisme is 
killing our republic and human society today,” Frederic detailed why he never liked 
America.  
When I said that I never liked America, it is with all of what has 
happened or what happened is based with who was the number one of 
the world. It's America. America is the number one. America is the one 
who's giving direction, giving order to do things to other people, and 
then when you look at immigrants, that helps because I'm an immigrant. 
I cannot deny it. Then I have to say thank you. I have to be thankful to 
the country who welcomed me. With warm hands to say that come in 
my country. I understand that, but myself, I see beyond the welcome. 
 
Let's be honest. Even now our passports, they always say originally 
from just see then that identity still sticks with us. We are ‘originally from’ 
somewhere and then we are here. We've become citoyens [citizens] of 
this country, but every time they see it they say, no, this one is originally 
from there. And that's why I say they will never call me American. They 
will never call me American. They will always call me African because of 
what I am. 
 
________ 
Any analysis of refugee resettlement that ignores the intersecting forces of race, global 
capitalism, and Western (neo)imperialism cannot account for either the causal effects that force 
refugee flows, or the social values that dominate refugee receiving societies. Within studies of 
RCOs, the tendency to limit studies to the functions of the organization creates problems of 
perspective for researchers that prevent a broader analysis. Typically, one of two approaches are 
followed:  
(i) a specific ethnic community’s organizational capacity is studied within one locality 
and/or across several discrete localities, or  
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(ii) organizations are grouped by function (i.e. political incorporation, social service 
provision, etc.) and the institutions formed by refugees from various ethnic 
backgrounds are studied.  
As with most resettlement studies, the nation-state is taken to be the relevant unit of 
analysis. This leads to a phenomenon Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2003) call “methodological 
nationalism,” or the centering of the nation-state in research that overemphasizes the peculiarities 
of each sovereign entity within an international system. The primary reason for methodological 
nationalism within RCO studies is that the state has, for the first time in the timeline of the 
refugee, become the most relevant scale of governance. While migration is (perhaps over-
simplistically) described as the “orphan of the global institutional architecture” (Goldin, 
Cameron, and Balarajan 2011: 7), refugees represent a rare incidence of multilateral institutional 
governance throughout the migration apparatus, from the granting of refugee status, to interim 
aid provision in camps, to (extreme) screening and the selection of refugees for resettlement in 
receiving nations like the United States (Betts 2013). Accessing state-specific public benefit 
channels and learning a language suddenly take precedence over navigating multilateral 
processes formalized by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Once refugees have been resettled, they exit the 
international framework designed to resettle them and enter into a state’s domestic policy.  
There exists an epistemological bifurcation between the categories of “forced migrants,” 
which includes refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons, and “voluntary 
migrants,” who are presumed to choose migration for any number of freely selected reasons. 
Within this conception, refugee migration is the product of humanitarian international policy, 
whereas voluntary migration is the product of economics. Saskia Sassen writes that  
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immigration policy is shaped by an understanding of immigration as the 
consequence of the individual actions of emigrants; the receiving country is taken 
as a passive agent, one not implicated in the process of emigration. In refugee 
policy, in contrast, there is a recognition of other factors, beyond the control of 
individuals, as leading to outflows. (1998: 7) 
 
Scholars have long established the fallacy of each of these concepts; many forced 
migrants voluntarily exercise agency throughout the migration process, and many voluntary 
migrants leave out of necessity rather than volition. But the division in definition and analysis 
remains. 
Debates around definitions of refugees are vital because they shape the experiences and 
entitlements that migrants can claim. The very narrow label of refugee, which requires a migrant 
to be outside of their country of origin and, as a result of political, ethnic, or social affiliation, to 
have a well-founded fear of persecution that prevents their return to their native land (United 
Nations 1950),  changes the rights to which one is entitled, the migratory pathway one takes for 
entry into a receiving nation, and the ease with which citizenship and civic rights can be 
obtained. Increasingly, scholars like Betts (2013) are calling for expanded definitions of 
refugeeness and forced migration, advancing terms like “survival migrants” to capture those 
emigrants whose human rights and needs are not met within their homeland context. But the 
labels placed upon migrants have enormous repercussions for their experiences. Importantly, 
because there exists a recognizable domestic governance apparatus for refugee admissions, 
controls on refugee admissions are more easily implemented than those for non-refugees. 
Stephen Castles notes that migration controls often fail “because policymakers refuse to 
see migration as a dynamic social process linked to broader patterns of social transformation. 
Ministers and bureaucrats still see migration as something that can be turned on and off like a tap 
through laws and policies” (2003: 26). While Castles’ remarks help explain the expansion of 
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voluntary and illegal migration even through periods of more strict controls, his statement does 
not apply as neatly to formal refugee admissions in the United States. Because resettlement 
requires the coordination of an international governance regime with individual nation-states, 
and because refugee resettlement falls within the scope of administrative branch responsibilities, 
refugee admissions are particularly susceptible to restrictionist popular and policy movements. 
Indeed, the rise of Donald Trump and the subsequent throttling of America’s refugee 
resettlement program show the power of increased public and administrative resentment against 
migration; in comparing the first 5 months of fiscal years 2017 and 2018, refugee admissions in 
the United States have decreased by a staggering 77 percent, from 37,028 to 8,414 admissions 
(Refugee Processing Center 2017, 2018). Put another way, for every ten refugees resettled last 
year, roughly two refugees are being resettled this year. 
Though the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants is perhaps overstated, 
there are clear differences in the needs of and controls on refugee communities that influence the 
way in which they organize. These differences are rarely reflected in existing literature. Indeed, 
it is rare that organizations specifically structured to assist with refugees or forced migrants are 
studied independently. Typically, refugee organizations are subsumed within a larger group of 
migrant community organizations. Economic or social analyses of voluntary organizations tend 
to focus on general migrant organizations, either including refugees within the broader category 
of “migrant,” or, more commonly, excluding the category of analysis altogether. If they are 
afforded their own attention, RCOs are typically studied in terms of some aspect of their clients’ 
“refugeeness”— that is to say, in the role they play with regards to some aspect of forced 
migration specifically, such as navigating asylum policies or assisting with experiences of 
trauma (Griffiths, Sigona, and Zetter 2005).  
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The atomized approach to the study of RCOs limits the ability of researchers to examine 
two major facts of refugee resettlement. First, it constrains the ability of researchers to situate 
refugees within an increasingly global capitalist economy. Second, it terrifically handicaps 
understandings of race relating to refugees.  
Suggesting that refugees are migrants forced to leave their home as a result of forces 
beyond their control, the international community obscures the role a global capitalist system, 
based largely on the exploitation of African peoples and resources, has played in acquiescing in, 
abetting, and creating the conflicts and crises that lead to displacement. While a detailed history 
of the exploitation of the Congo is impossible in this forum, the combined effects of: the 
abduction and ethnocide of African peoples in the 15th through 18th centuries during the 
transatlantic slave trade; the savagely violent rubber economy operated by King Leopold II in the 
1800s; the mercantile colonial rule of Belgium; the surveillance and murder of Pan-Africanist 
Patrice Lumumba and subsequent death of the Congolese democratic-socialist movement; three 
decades of kleptocratic rule by Mobutu Sese Seko; and the past two decades of violence, largely 
funded by profits from militia- or foreign-operated mines, all relate to the (proto)capitalist need 
for cheap resources, expanded markets, and profit from African resources and surplus labor 
(Rodney [1972] 2011; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2007; Autesserre 2006). 
In addition to preventing the historicizing of conflict, disembodying resettled refugee 
populations from global structures and currents fails to contextualize the environment into which 
refugees integrate and which pressures they can expect. Changes to the world economy have 
caused dramatic shifts to both the peripheral economic sectors that refugees leave behind and the 
core sectors into which they are expected to integrate. Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) 
conceptualized the worlds-systems theory as an historical model of change rooted in a world 
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economy that leads to domination by core countries and the subjugation of peripheral countries. 
Peripheral countries are dependent on core countries for capital, while core countries exploit 
peripheral countries for labor and raw materials. Within migration, the world-system Wallerstein 
describes can be observed on the individual or familial level. Through networks of remittances 
and the maintenance of transnational kinship roles, refugees participate in a global exchange of 
capital that must be acknowledged in any study of their organizations. And via migration 
patterns, labor from peripheral countries can fill needs within core countries created by a global 
neoliberal economy. 
The current economic structure, marked by states which have reduced barriers to 
competition via structural adjustment programs and multilateral trade agreements, incentivizes 
production sectors to shift from the high-wage and (formerly) well-organized labor of core 
nations to low-wage, non-unionized labor of periphery nations (Prashad 2012). Sassen (1999: 40) 
explains the effect of these pressures on the American economy:  
As industrial production has moved overseas, the traditional US manufacturing 
base has eroded and been partly replaced by a downgraded manufacturing sector, 
which is characterized by a growing supply of poorly paid, semi-skilled or 
unskilled production jobs. 
 
Low-paying, low-skilled jobs represent a growth sector in core economies like the United 
States. The growth in low-skill jobs, coupled with the fact that high-skill immigrants are often 
pushed into low-wage sectors of their new hostland economy, leads to an increased number of 
immigrants filling the low-skill labor need in advanced economies. Production, in other words, is 
rendered a high-growth, low-wage sector under conditions of global capitalism, which draws 
migrant employment. Refugees are incorporated into this economy, often with the help of the 
resettlement and ethnic community-based organizations that are supposed to serve their interests.  
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The second reality that a case study-based epistemology of RCOs ignores is the effect of 
race on refugee solidarities. While the studies of race and migration often intersect, with the 
study of refugees, race is often conflated with ethnicity in analyses of particular ethnic 
communities. It is not studied as a systemic, inherent feature of our global socioeconomic reality; 
rather, it is assigned as a series of prejudices that can be activated into mobilization of dominant 
(white) classes and policy restrictions. The study of the synergy between xenophobia and race in 
this context, often called “xeno-racism” (Cheran 2001; Fekete 2001; Searle 2017), is certainly a 
necessary and welcome inclusion. 
Yet in order to fully understand the impact of race on the structures of governance, race 
must be analyzed as systemic, global phenomenon linked to economic profit. The inability to 
situate RCOs within a regime of global racism follows what Charles Mills (1997) calls an 
epistemology of ignorance, stemming from an inability of white academics (or those who do not 
interrogate the epistemological foundations of white supremacy) to discern the terms of what he 
terms the “racial contract.” According to Mills, the racial contract is a set of formal and informal 
agreements that have categorized the world into classes of full persons, called white, and a 
remaining subset of inferior humans, who are nonwhite. The benefits of full-personhood are 
protected by an international order that enshrines white privilege and maintains the systemic 
access to power that defines whiteness, all while obscuring the terms of the contract from the 
epistemological perspective of its beneficiaries. A lengthy passage from Mills both details the 
epistemological folly of white thought and the ambition of making systemic politico-economic 
racism legible: 
What is involved [in the racial contract] is neither a simple variant of traditional 
European nationalism (to which it is sometimes assimilated) nor a mysterious 
political project unfolding in some alien theoretical space (as in the mutually 
opaque language games postulated by postmodernism). The unifying conceptual 
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space within which both orthodox white moral/political philosophy and 
unorthodox nonwhite moral/political philosophy are developing is the space that 
locates the (mythical) social contract on the same plane as the (real) Racial 
Contract… thereby demonstrating that these are contiguous, indeed identical, 
spaces—not so much a different conceptual universe as a recognition of the dark 
matter of the existing one. (Mills 1997: 111, emphasis in original) 
 
In addition to positioning the social contract model of Western political authority in 
relation to racial supremacy, Mills laments the current intellectual tools for examining race. He 
critiques “white liberalism predicated on colorless atomic individuals and a white Marxism 
predicated on colorless classes in struggle” (Mills 1997: 111) as being insufficient for the study 
of race on the global level, which has infiltrated psychology, ideology, politics, and economics.  
 In a global capitalist system, the marginalized position of Black peoples has licensed 
exploitation by the West, creating a subclass of laborers that have been exploited throughout 
history. Michelle Wright (2004) notes that classist formulations of peasant inferiority articulated 
by French theorist Arthur de Gobineau were repurposed to justify slavery, just as Thomas 
Jefferson’s writings on Black intellectual deficiency “otherized” Black bodies and encouraged 
the unpaid exploitation of Black labor in slavery. Patricia Hill Collins (2005) writes that 
animalistic analogies to Black bodies enabled domestication myths to pervade regarding the 
paternalistic and supposedly civilizing role of whites in slavery. Importantly, Collins notes that 
racial distinctions were maintained by understandings of gender and sexuality, which served to 
create an underclass of sub-humans during chattel slavery. The concepts articulated in slavery 
(sovereignty over Black bodies) were replicated during colonial imperialism (sovereignty over 
Black lands) and neo-colonialism (sovereignty over Black societies and economies), continuing 
the exploitation of Black peoples and resources for Western profit. Walter Rodney (1972/2011: 
89) notes, “Oppression follows logically from exploitation so as to guarantee the latter. 
Oppression of African people on purely racial grounds accompanied, strengthened, and became 
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indistinguishable from oppression for economic reasons.” What began as exploitation of Black 
bodies for profit became a socialized racial contract metastasized throughout all aspects of a 
global society, oppressing and marginalizing Black peoples.  
CLR James provides a forceful reminder that the racial question cannot unfasten itself 
from an exploitative, class-based project of capital accumulation: “The race question is 
subsidiary to the class question in politics, and to think of imperialism in terms of race is 
disastrous. But to neglect the racial factor as merely incidental is an error only less grave than to 
make it fundamental” (James [1938] 1989: 283). Within the study of RCOs, race must be 
considered not only within the narrow confines of national ethno-centrism and xenophobia, but 
also as a construct that intersects with gender, sexuality, and nationality to be exploited as a 
profit mechanism. Race cannot be discounted as incidental to the organization of refugees, as it 
affects the conditions that cause forced migrants to flee their homelands, as well as the racial 
stratification of society that greets refugees once they are resettled. 
 We are left with two outcomes, seemingly at odds with one another. On the one hand, 
global capitalism, abetted by multilateral (neo)liberalization and pressures to expand production, 
creates in core economies a need for low-skill, low-wage labor that is often filled by migrants. 
On the other hand, a society built on racism leads the public to demand, and extremist politicians 
to pursue, restrictionist policies that limit the intake of forced migrants. It is not my intention to 
reconcile this dialectic, nor do I aim to provide a complete picture of the various other 
unacknowledged tensions, from humanitarianism to international development, that affect 
American immigration, including refugee resettlement. But it is necessary to reintroduce the 
global pressures of international systemic racism and an increasingly connected world economy 
into an analysis of RCOs. 
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 Refugee community organizations are located within a web of social, political, economic, 
and international relations. Atomizing the study of refugees without reference to larger global 
trends, when coupled with epistemologies of ignorance ill-equipped to analyze migration in 
terms of race, gender, and identity, limit the scope of any study of organizational capacity in 
migrant communities. By isolating the RCO from global structural factors, the theoretical 
approaches that dominate the study of RCOs take capitalism and racism as inherent and un-
interrogated features of global society, favoring the perpetuation of exploitative systems by 
failing to acknowledge them. The isolation of RCOs serves as a scientific control that directs 
focus to two dominant trends in the study of these institutions: the RCO as a component of 
refugee civil society, and the civic or social functions of refugee organizations that define their 
presentation in the academy. 
 
The RCO as Civil Society: Historicizing the Theoretical Foundations 
It is widely held that refugee community organizations represent a branch of civil society. 
According to Woldring (1998: 363), civil society is defined as “free associations that exist as 
intermediate institutions between citizens and the state, and in which citizens can realize their 
social freedom and equality.” Alexis de Tocqueville was among the first political theorists to 
write about civil society, framing it as a frontier of liberty and socio-political self-expression that 
the state, viewing a network of free associations as a threat to sovereignty, would attempt to 
undermine and coopt (Tocqueville [1835] 1988: 504-510).  
Tocqueville’s thinking was framed by Hobbesian conceptions of the state that pervaded 
turn-of-the 19th century thinking. Indeed, even the use of the term “society” within civil society 
captures a dichotomous framing of state and society. Thomas Paine captures the tension between 
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state and society in his seminal Common Sense: “Society is produced by our wants, and 
government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness POSITIVELY by uniting our 
affections, the latter NEGATIVELY by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, 
the other creates distinctions. The first a patron, the last a punisher” ([1776] 2014: 4). To Paine, 
the constraining state is a force exerted on the populace to limit dangerous freedoms, and 
Tocqueville believes civil society exists as a barrier and safeguard to this totalizing tendency of 
the state.  
Tocqueville’s presentation of civil society positions free associations as separate from the 
state, and at tension with a power-hungry government. As Bloemraad (2005) notes, 
Tocqueville’s formulation represents a common theme in scholarship for analyses of civil society 
infrastructure on migrant integration. Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that civil 
society is not only distinct from other superstructural elements, but entirely isolated from them. 
In his analysis of the measurement of ethnic communities, Fennema defines civil society as “the 
sphere that is not under coercion of the state, not within the sphere of the family, and also outside 
the market economy. In other words it excludes those spheres where human relations are driven 
either by biological necessities (the family), by economic necessity (the market) or by force (the 
state)” (2004: 429). To Fennema, and many scholars whose work investigates RCOs, civil 
society is an independent organ impervious to economic, political, and social pressures. 
While civil society may serve as an important arena of resistance against state-imposed 
tyranny, it is clear that such a formulation requires cautious critique. Particularly in the arena of 
refugee resettlement, free associations like refugee community organizations cannot be 
considered wholly independent from the state. RCOs have been actively recruited and 
incorporated into state functions such as refugee resettlement. The network of ECBOs that assist 
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with post-resettlement in Massachusetts have formed a Mutual Assistance Association (MAA) 
coalition in partnership with the Massachusetts Office of Refugees and Immigrants (ORI) “to 
provide an array of community outreach, education and direct services to refugee communities in 
Massachusetts” (ORI 2018). The official website of ORI lists the services, functions, and names 
of civil society organizations that partner with the state government to administer aspects of the 
refugee resettlement apparatus. The relationship with the state is not contentious, but 
cooperative. Clearly, Woldring’s definition, in which civil society plays a mediating role 
between the individual and the state, proves far more satisfactory for the task at hand than that 
provided by Fennema. The very act of mediating presupposes contact with both sides, and 
thereby implies the connections that Fennema’s definition elides.  
For the context of refugee community organizations in Boston, conceiving of civil 
society as an arena of conflict with the state requires expansion. As neoliberal governance 
pressures encourage the privatization of state functions and the creation of a dependent 
associational civic environment, a conflict- and separation-driven view of state-civil society 
relations is, in short, too simplistic (see Chapter 2). Instead, the interface between the public and 
associational spheres reveals key insights into the adaptations of both the state and civil society 
to various social and political pressures. There are webs of relations characterized by both 
conflict and cooperation.  
An alternative view accounts for an interface between the public and associational 
spheres, transforming cooperation into a veiled arena of conflict. A number of scholars 
(Habermas 1989; Joyce and Shambra 1996) contend that state intervention or encroachment can 
lead to the “crowding out” of civil society, reproducing what Woldring (1998) identifies as the 
tendency of governors to consolidate and concentrate power in an attempt to make non-state 
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civic processes legible from a centralized perspective (Scott 1998). The very idea of crowding 
out presupposes quasi-territorial civic sovereignty and an invasion by outside influence. The 
state, seeking stability by extending its influence into the associational sphere, targets and 
controls those elements, which are most resistive and threatening to its power. 
My position is that stability in the American refugee resettlement system has been 
maintained by institutions and organizations coordinating with the state, replicating its objectives 
and submitting to oversight of many functions. This conceptualization draws partly from 
Antonio Gramsci (1999) and his writings on hegemony, which evolve beyond both orthodox 
Marxist economism and a conflict-based relationship between institutions and the state. Ankie 
Hoogvelt notes that Gramsci “developed the notion of hegemony as a ‘fit’ between power, ideas 
and institutions to explain the stability of capitalist class relations and a national social order” 
(2001: 10). Gramsci’s contribution demonstrates the interconnectedness between institutions and 
ideas, on the one hand, and state power, on the other. Skeptical of class struggle as the lone 
explanatory agent of historical change, Gramsci proposes that the evolution of social structure 
culminates in hegemony, which, according to Stuart Hall, 
transcends the corporate limits of purely economic solidarity, encompasses the 
interests of other subordinate groups, and begins to ‘propagate itself throughout 
society’, bringing about intellectual and moral as well as economic and political 
unity, and ‘posing also the questions around which the struggle rages…thus 
creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate 
groups.’ (Hall 1986: 15) 
 
Hall’s articulation of Gramsci’s contribution creates space for cultural and social values, 
including race and gender, to merge with productive forces in creating relations of dominance. 
But the cumulative effect of hegemony is not total domination. In an important deviation from 
Marxist tradition, the dynamics of dominance do not lend themselves to an absolute victory, but 
rather to “relations of forces favourable or unfavourable to this or that tendency” (quoted in Hall 
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1986: 14). To Gramsci, the interests of the subordinated class and its institutions do not wholly 
disappear as a result of the victory. Substituting the Marxist zero-sum game of domination for a 
series of relational forces respects and accounts for the agency and struggle of both the 
subjugated and the subaltern (Gramsci 1999: 202). 
 The refugee resettlement apparatus features a host of subordinate institutions who submit 
to the hegemonic vision of resettlement dictated by the state, which represents the interests of the 
dominant social group. While American refugee resettlement civil society remains outside the 
purview and explicit control of the state, dependence upon the government and replication of 
state objectives suggest unequal forces of relations that benefit the state (and those whose power 
the state represents).  
The perspective on civil society taken for this project balances the tensions of Gramsci’s 
and Tocqueville’s works. First, as an element of civil society, RCOs are viewed as derivative of 
the state, while remaining partially independent from the state. Though there exists hegemonic 
capture of ideology in civil society, there is a degree of separation between the public and 
associational spheres. This understanding strikes a balance between the relative autonomy of 
function and accountability mechanisms found in civil society with the unity of purpose and 
conceptual ideas found in coalitions with the state. The position I take represents a mean between 
certain scholars of RCOs, who create too strict a separation between political and civil society, 
and Gramsci, whose fuzzy distinctions between the two suggest a unified hegemonic coalition 
between the state and civil society.  
 Second, it must be acknowledged that American civil society is embedded within a global 
system of institutions and structures to resettle refugees. Althusser and Balibar, drawing from 
Gramsci, articulated the concept of “social formations” as a counterweight to Marxist 
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economism. They argue that the economic forces of global capitalism result in a complex 
ordering of society, featuring multiple levels of articulation that weave economic, political, and 
ideological relations in overlapping structures that transcend the economic sphere alone 
(Althusser and Balibar 1997). It is within this relational network that RCO civil society exists. In 
a system of global capitalism, the economic forces of capitalist class domination, to quote 
Gramsci, “can simply create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of 
thought, and certain ways of posing and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent 
development of national life” (Gramsci 1999: 409). Rather than determining superstructure, 
economic interests promote the development of hospitable ideas by shaping the intellectual 
terrain. Emerging from the soil of this terrain is the current civil society, which participates in 
both resistance to and compliance with a state-imposed agenda. 
 While the Tocquevillian tradition of civil society as the guardian of individual liberty has 
inspired important research on RCOs, the paradigm must shift to situate refugee organizations 
within broader ideological, social, and political environments. Re-orienting the perspective to 
account for hegemony and global economic forces is necessary for understanding the position 
and function of RCOs. When taken alone, however, it is far from sufficient. In addition to 
situating the RCO within an institutional ecosystem, it is necessary to examine the ways these 
organizations have been studied by researchers. 
 
The Limits of Functionalism and Integrative Modeling 
My initial ambition for this project was to determine the sociocultural role of refugee 
community organizations in the Greater Boston Area. In articulating this objective, I situated my 
research within a long line of functionalist analyses of migrant organizations. The guiding 
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hypothesis draws from the intellectual legacy of Emile Durkheim, whose writings serve as the 
lens through which migrant organizations are often viewed.  
Durkheim posited that the proliferation and diffusion of a capitalist mode of production 
fundamentally re-organizes society around the division of labor. In analyzing the effect of the 
division of labor on society, Durkheim draws from two pioneering thinkers. The first, Adam 
Smith ([1776] 1902), articulates the division of labor as a fundamental feature of capitalist 
society that increases productive capacity by encouraging differentiation and, consequently, 
specialization. The second, Karl Marx ([1844] 1964), argues that the division of labor associated 
with a capitalist mode of production leads to alienation (Entfremdung) from products, work, 
other people, and the self. Durkheim ([1893] 1984) suggests that as the division of labor in 
capitalism transformed relational identities, individuals became detached from the social bonds 
which previously held society together. Under such conditions, the question of social cohesion 
demands attention: “How does it come about that the individual, whilst becoming more 
autonomous, depends ever more closely upon society? How can he become at the same time 
more of an individual and yet more linked to society?” (Durkheim [1893] 1984: xxx). 
The answer, for Durkheim, lay in organic solidarity. Contrast against mechanical 
solidarity, in which self-sufficient, undifferentiated “social molecules” relate directly to society 
and subordinate the self to the social unit, organic solidarity emerges from conditions of 
differentiation and the elevation of the individual, suggesting that individuals serving different 
functions could together create a collective social identity (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 84-85).  The 
concept evokes Tönnies’ ([1887] 2001) distinction between kinship-/neighborhood-based 
solidarities (Gemeinschaft), on the one hand, and civic-/societal-based solidarities (Gesellschaft), 
on the other hand. Unlike Tönnies, who believed communal bonds were superior to societal 
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bonds, Durkheim upheld organic solidarity as a means for articulating identity in periods of 
structural transition. Undergirding Durkheim’s analysis is the conviction that under conditions of 
differentiation, each of the discrete institutions that collectively comprise society serves a vital 
function for the body social. Interrogating the function of the social unit reveals not only the role 
the unit plays, but also the social need the function addresses (Durkheim [1893] 1984: 11). From 
this theoretical framing—in which the function of institutions determines both their social value 
and the basis of communal solidarity—emerged the Durkheimian tradition of functionalism. 
The relationship between organizational function and social need has led migration 
scholars to examine the factors that contribute to the emergence of migrant organizations. In his 
widely-cited article on ethnic organizations, Breton (1964) argues that three factors contribute to 
the rise of ethnic institutions: cultural differences between the migrant and native populations, 
the amount of resources available to the community, and the nature of migratory flows. Based on 
the confluence of these characteristics, Breton claims ethnic organizations can affect the 
“direction of the social integration of immigrants” (1964: 204), either into a native hostland 
society or into an ethnic migrant community. Ethnic difference, or a conflict between cultural 
values, leads migrants to seek organizations that encourage cultural self-expression and address 
community needs.  
As Marquez (2001) notes, cultural conflict and intra-ethnic social solidarity can lead 
immigrant communities to fence themselves off and maintain a claim of cultural difference from 
the native society. The effect of this consolidation is the creation of institutions that not only 
address the needs of migrant populations, but also contribute to a sense of identity. Rex (1987: 
16-17, cited in Griffiths, Sigona, and Zetter 2005) captured the dual role organizations are 
believed to play in terms of both socialization and identity formation, stating that migrant groups 
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like ECBOs “may perhaps be thought of as playing for immigrant populations something like the 
role which Durkheim assigned to occupational groups. Clearly they do play some role in the 
socialization of the individual and offer him some kind of answer to the question ‘Who am I?’” 
Rex listed four main functions of migrant organizations: overcoming isolation, offering material 
help, advocating for interests, and promoting culture.  
The ideas established by Durkheim, later elaborated by Breton and Rex, have had far-
reaching effects on the study of migrant community organizations. As LaCroix, Baffoe, and 
Liguori (2015: 67) note, “RCOs contribute to individual and community well-being and 
integration into the wider society,” citing research that points to positive outcomes in terms of (i) 
resettlement assistance, care, solidarity, and crisis management (Nee & Sanders 2001; Portes 
1995), (ii) economic adaptation (Nee & Sanders 2001), (iii) political and civic incorporation 
(Tillie 2005; Cordero-Guzman 2005), and (iv) mediation between communities and public 
institutions (Fennema and Tillie 2001; Mestheneos and Ionaddi 2002).  
Griffiths, Sigona, and Zetter (2005) call the functionalist approach the “general 
paradigm” of migrant organizations. Functionalist concepts have also been replicated in how 
organizations conceive of themselves. The CDC replicates many of Rex’s criteria for ethnic 
organizations on the mission page of its website, stating that the organization seeks to:  
• Provide basic resources, services, information and skills needed to ease the 
transition and facilitate the integration into the new life in the United States. 
• Strengthen the Congolese community by promoting mutual assistance, 
increasing their capacity to serve their local communities. 
• Mobilize the expertise of refugees and immigrants through partnerships with a 
network of community-based organizations to ensure good use of the most 
relevant African expertise for sustainable development in Africa. (Congolese 
Development Center 2018) 
 
Given the chance to define itself, the CDC refers to the functions it provides the 
community. I asked Eric, the Executive Director, about the role of the CDC in the community: 
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We provide a, uh, an array of services, mostly is direct services. I just mentioned 
a couple of them before, uh, you know, er that’s including, you know, helping 
refugees navigate the system. Uh, that's can be taking them to appointments, to 
their mail, teaching them skills, prepare resumes, apply jobs online, anything. So 
that's why it's just direct services include a lot of stuff there. 
 
In applying Rex’s four primary functions, the statements articulated by the CDC 
regarding its role includes references to several of the four functions of migrant organizations. 
Importantly, the goals relate to overarching functions of the organization, relating to social 
integration into America and (Congolese) national development in Africa.   
 The functions of RCOs are valuable, according to prevailing research, for two reasons: 
the ability to achieve or facilitate some aspect of integration, and the ability to create access to 
social capital. Both integration and social capital, which are contested and rather nebulous terms, 
require definition for this research. 
My definition of integration will derive from community psychology, borrowing what 
Floyd Rudmin (2003) presents as the fourfold theory of acculturation. Rudmin presents minority 
and dominant cultures (represented by the letters M and D) that are assigned positive or negative 
valence (represented by the signs + or -) based on their reception in a society. Integration, or the 
coexistence of two cultural forms in a system of bi-/multi-culturalism (+M +D), is contrast 
against: (i) assimilation, where the dominant culture is favored (-M +D), (ii) separation, where 
the minority culture is favored (+M -D), and (iii) marginalization, where both cultures are 
diminished (-M -D). Integration suggests the seamless acceptance of a minority culture and a 
dominant culture, where both are valued, maintained, and celebrated.  
It is clear over the last two decades that America, like other “multicultural democracies,” 
has shifted away from this trend in favor of a more assimilationist model that requires knowledge 
of language, an emphasis on patriotism and nationalistic allegiance, and participation in a 
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citizenship regime (Griffiths, Sigona, and Zetter 2006; Cheong et al 2007; Fekete 2001). 
Nevertheless, integration, as I use it, will represent the multicultural ideal of promoting both the 
dominant and minority cultures without domination by the native culture.  
Contrast against the sheen of idealism, the reality of integration is far more complex. 
Black scholars like Oliver Cromwell Cox note that the connections between class, race, and the 
exploitation of Black peoples makes the integration of Black peoples into white societies an 
impossibility. Klarlund, writing on Cox, captures how the perceived un-assimilability of Black 
peoples is central to exploitation for capital accumulation. 
Cox relates racial antagonism to a political-class conflict. For the capitalist to 
keep this commodity of labor exploitive, ways to keep it exploitable must be 
devised. Race prejudice then became an important device to hinder the 
assimilation of the minority because assimilation would diminish the exploitative 
possibilities of this group. (Klarlund 1994: 88) 
 
To Cox, racial difference is the axis of exclusion that forecloses opportunities for 
integration. Groups that cannot integrate into a society maintain a marginalized position that 
lends itself to exploitation by dominant groups. Steve Martinot believes that the marginalized 
position of the racial other produces dynamics of internalized inequality that give rise to 
structural racism. 
Differentiation is not the driving force of racialization. What drives racialization 
on a daily basis is the system of social importance attached to the act of noticing, 
the self-superiorization that attaches to the inferiorization of the other. Racism is 
the name of this driving force, and racialization is its daily effect…. Prejudice is 
an expression of racism, the insult heaped on those already injured by oppression, 
on those denigrated by having been forced into inferiorizing social 
categorizations; it is an expression of complex social operations which racialize. 
One does not ostracize a group because one is prejudiced; one becomes 
prejudiced against a group because they have been ostracized, excluded, and 
oppressed. (Martinot 2003: 75-76) 
  
For both Cox and Martinot, the very concepts of race and racism are incompatible with 
claims to integration or inclusion within mainstream society. This prevents Black peoples from 
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accessing the benefits and privileges associated with dominant culture. In short, integration is 
irreconcilable with Blackness in Western capitalist societies. The very premise of race and 
racism ensure that the dominant culture will always be privileged, justifying exploitation of 
Black peoples, cultures, labor, and bodies. 
The second term requiring further definition is social capital. Pierre Bourdieu defines 
social capital as “the aggregate of actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of 
a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition—which provides each of its members with the backing of collectively owned 
capital” (Bourdieu 1986: 251). Bourdieu links social networks to the economic sphere, providing 
a resource that can be exploited to reap economic benefits. Though some scholars prefer a 
definition offered by Putnam (1995), which essentially argues for the inherent value of diverse 
social networks, I share the critique that it is too broad in that it celebrates “essentially social 
relations that produce good outcomes” (Nawyn et al 2012: 257). For a social resource to be 
considered capital, it must be exploitable by “social capitalists” to generate wealth. 
I believe that, in the study of African populations, Pan Africanism must be examined as a 
tool of social capital. The central goal of the Pan Africanist movement is to achieve solidarity 
among African peoples all over the world. In theory, unity is the foundational rallying cry that 
galvanizes the Pan Africanist movement. This unity spans across ethnic and national divides, 
across continents, and across class lines. As Walter Rodney said, Pan Africanism occurs when 
“the people of one part of Africa are responsible for the freedom and liberation of their brothers 
and sisters in other parts of Africa; and indeed, black people everywhere accept the same 
responsibility” (quoted in Campbell 1996: 216). 
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Pan Africanism as a source of social capital cannot succumb to what Eddie Glaude calls 
the “troublesome notion of [B]lack interests” that lead to facile appeals to Black identity and the 
erasure of class, gender, sexual, and ethnic divisions (Glaude 2016: 127). Rather, Pan Africanism 
must be an exercise in self-definition against the hegemonic silencing of Black peoples. 
Campbell offers that African cultural values like the dignity of human beings must replace 
material evaluations: “Pan Africanism is about the dignity of the African person and it is now 
clear that this dignity cannot be quantified in material terms” (Campbell 1996: 226). By 
centering dignity, African culture becomes a tool for countering economic fundamentalism 
within global neoliberalism, in which markets determine self-worth. Though Frantz Fanon was 
skeptical of undifferentiated continental unity, he offers a quote that captures the importance of 
developing Pan African culture as a means of resistance: “The problem is not as yet to secure a 
national culture, not as yet to lay hold of a movement differentiated by nations, but to assume an 
African or Arabic culture when confronted by the all-embracing condemnation pronounced by 
the dominating power” (Fanon 1963: 214). 
Locating culture as a response to domination positions Pan Africanism as a tool of Black 
resistance. Indeed, emphasizing a Pan African culture based on the dignity of the African person 
intersects with the expectation that MAAs provide culturally appropriate services to clients. The 
CDC works with clients from a number of African nations, expanding their scope beyond 
Congolese nationals alone. As Chapter 3 documents, the CDC’s cultural competency and 
provision of non-material services represents a conversion of Pan African theory into social 
capital, centering the dignity of African peoples while connecting them with resources that can 
be exploited for personal benefit or survival.  
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Functionalist studies of RCOs tend to follow one of two dominant models: a deductive 
model, in which the RCO is hypothesized to serve a particular function, and researchers evaluate 
to what extent the RCO fulfills that function; and an inductive model, in which case studies of 
community organizations for specific populations are scrutinized to determine which functions 
community organizations serve. Both the inductive and deductive functionalist approaches yield 
key insights into the operations of RCOs, but are limited in that researchers impose a utilitarian 
understanding of function onto the organization that may not match the ways these organizations 
are understood, utilized, or intended. As Griffiths, Sigona, and Zetter (2006: 885) note, these 
conceptions are pervasive: “Idealized, functional models of RCOs and unproblematic notions of 
community and representation predominate in much of the literature.”  
 I contend that in order to best understand the sociocultural role of the RCO, less emphasis 
should be placed on function. It may not be useful for both RCO practitioners or the populations 
they serve to write a report card evaluating the provision of services by RCOs. Instead, I 
advocate for an emphasis on ground level understandings. Following the interpretivist tradition 
of Clifford Geertz (1973) and community-based refugee researchers (Steimel 2016;  Stewart et al 
2008), I have sought to analyze the ways people conceive of community organizations as cultural 
constructions. I borrow Geertz’s definition of culture as “an historically transmitted pattern of 
meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms 
by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and 
attitudes toward life” (Geertz 1973: 89). Deviating from a functionalist approach reaffirms the 
idea that organizations like RCOs are symbols, and as such represent fluid, ever-evolving social 
constructs that derive their power from multiple sources. It allows categories of meaning to 
originate from those who use these institutions, not those who study them. Attempting a bottom-
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up perspective of institutions can illuminate barriers to access that a functionalist perspective 
may render invisible. Ethnography may provide a solution. As DeVault notes, the proliferation of 
institutional ethnographies, “built from the examination of work processes and study of how they 
are coordinated, typically through texts and discourses of various sorts” (DeVault 2006: 294), 
attempts to use qualitative tools to arrive at a textured understanding of organization(s). 
The ability to name the functions an organization fulfills reinforces the power of 
researchers and the academic agenda in creating knowledge. Foucault ([1977] 1995) notes the 
relationship between knowledge and power, asserting that power and knowledge not only 
directly imply one another, but also reveal, through acquisition and modalities of knowledge, the 
effects of power and the ability to exercise it. Like any institution, positions of power and axes of 
privilege affect the ability of populations to activate the functions that RCOs supposedly fulfill. 
Shifting the axis of knowledge to accommodate different interpretations of organizations realigns 
power relations associated with the study of RCOs, both between researcher and subject 
population (epistemological power), and between organization and community (institutional 
power). In most functionalist analyses, and particularly in analyses of RCOs, power is structured 
vertically, possessed by those who operate structures and accessed by or selectively allocated to 
those who do not. Such an understanding threatens to erase agency while presenting power 
structures as immutable. My understanding of power draws from Foucault’s articulation of the 
term. He believes power  
is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not 
have it’; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts 
pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the 
grip it has on them. This means that these relations go right down into the depths 
of society, that they are not localized in the relations between the state and its 
citizens or on the frontier between classes and that they do not merely reproduce, 
at the level of individuals, bodies, gestures and behaviour, the general form of the 
law or government.... (Foucault [1977] 1995: 27) 
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Complicating the concept of power disrupts conventional conclusions of functionalism. It 
is my hope that restructuring power relations via an alternative theoretical lens will result in 
research that restores agency to clients of RCOs, elevating the position, perception, and 
knowledge of the marginalized.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is not to delegitimize or destabilize the approach that has 
guided the study of RCOs. Within this research, I will employ many of the same tactics I 
critique. I blur the distinctions of civil society, selectively presenting it both as mostly separate 
from the state and as mostly subsumed by the state. I will occasionally describe the RCO in 
relation to its function, as function is crucial to the cultural understandings of the institution. And 
I have chosen to study a single ethnic community within a single locality to bracket the field and 
lend my research specificity.  
By problematizing and expanding each of these concepts, it is my hope to improve upon 
the existing paradigm and apply a cross-disciplinary examination of refugee community 
organizations that uplifts the marginalized perspective and properly situates it within a global 
framework. In turn, I seek to ensure that my codes of understanding are not imposed upon the 
community, but rather emerge from it. From Frederic, whose narrative opens this analysis, I 
learned how refugees perceive the effects of global capitalism intersecting with race, gender, and 
otherizing identifiers to marginalize them. This is the “force” behind forced migrants. This must 
be the starting point of any research on refugee communities. 
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Chapter 2  
Yanking the chain: Neoliberal resettlement, 
 global refugee regimes, and the North Shore Congolese community 
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In 2016, the United States resettled more than 16,000 refugees from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), more than from any other country (BPRM 2016). Over 300 
Congolese refugees were resettled into Massachusetts in 2016, representing a higher number of 
resettled refugees than any other African nation for the first time ever, ranking third total behind 
Haitian and Iraqi refugees (ORI 2017b). A significant portion of these refugees were resettled 
into the North Shore suburbs of Boston, including the city of Lynn.  
Lynn represents a space of both challenge and opportunity for refugee resettlement. 
While the region lacks many of the social antecedents necessary for the successful 
accommodation of refugees, including affordable housing, sustainable employment, and quality 
public transportation, Lynn has developed a unique institutional ecosystem to maximize service 
delivery and integration outcomes for refugees. Through a partnership with the Massachusetts 
Office of Refugees and Immigrants (ORI), a coalition of six ethnic community based 
organizations (ECBOs) in Lynn joined the main refugee resettlement organization serving the 
region to provide comprehensive, centralized resettlement and post-resettlement services.  
The focus of this chapter is to examine the practices of policy implementation by 
resettlement and post-resettlement agencies, examining the extent to which non-governmental 
agencies, sub-contracted by the federal and state governments, communicate, replicate, and 
effect the objectives of the state based on the specific challenges of the receiving community. 
First, an outline of the resettlement infrastructure in the United States will be provided, 
examining the sub-contracted outsourcing of service provision to private agencies and the 
emphasis placed on self-sufficiency as the principal objective of resettlement. The privatization 
of services, which introduces competition for scarce and conditional funds, leads practitioners to 
favor measurable economic outcomes over the cultural or social needs of refugees. Next, the 
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practices and responses of practitioners will be examined in terms of the self-sufficiency 
objective. This analysis reveals two key findings: (1) consistent resource constraints lead 
practitioners to focus efforts on economic-based objectives, foregrounding measurable results 
that exhibit returns on investment and leading to economic fundamentalism in evaluations of the 
resettlement process; and (2) practitioners describe a transition toward accepting mostly male, 
single-case refugees, who are often considered the most easily employed. Resettling single 
individuals is an adaptation of resettlement implementation that eases burdens on resettlement 
agencies and transfers stresses and hardships to refugees. Finally, the paper will conclude with an 
analysis of the effects of the many decisions, adaptations, and practices that define the 
resettlement regime, examining how the implementation of resettlement policies impacts the 
refugees these organizations serve. The subsequent adaptations of the resettlement system, in 
turn, place added stress on refugees, as well as the post-resettlement ECBOs that exist partly 
outside of the purview of the state. 
 
Overview of the American Resettlement Regime 
The Refugee Act of 1980 created the contemporary US refugee resettlement framework. 
In addition to determining which individuals would be eligible for resettlement into the United 
States, Sec. 412 of the Refugee Act (1980) authorized the creation of programs for the “domestic 
resettlement of and assistance to refugees.” The Act empowers the Secretary of State to work 
with “private non-profit voluntary agencies” and state governments in the administration of 
resettlement aid. The State Department contracts nine private, non-profit National Resettlement 
Agencies (NRAs) to administer reception and placement (R&P) services, which occurs for the 
refugee’s first ninety days in the US (US Department of State 2018). The nine NRAs subcontract 
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a network of over 300 local affiliates that operate in 48 states (Darrow 2015a); these local 
agencies will be called either Volags (short for volunteer agencies) or resettlement agencies, used 
interchangeably in this work. Within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, an additional layer of 
support is leveraged through partnerships with Mutual Assistance Associations (MAAs), or 
grassroots ethnic community organizations that provide social support and direct services to 
refugee populations (ORI 2017a).  
Since the 1980 Refugee Act, the United States has relied on Volags and other private 
non-profit organizations in the resettlement and integration of refugees (Holman 1996; Kramer 
2003). The privatization of state functions emerged in the transition from what is called the 
“welfare state,” characterized by the ambitious social programs that marked postwar American 
government, to the “neoliberal state,” defined by an emphasis on limited public expenditure and 
the downsizing or privatization of social programs (Harvey 2005; Kramer 2003). Within 
American domestic politics, the late 1970s and 1980s marked a shift toward neo-liberal policies, 
including the devolution (Alexander 1999) and privatization of state functions; an increased 
emphasis on the individual, rather than the society, as the target of legislative action; and the 
strengthening of restrictive conditions on receipt of public benefits (Harvey 2005). Evolving 
from the Chicago school of economics and the teachings of Friedrich von Hayek, the theory of 
neo-liberalism regards state involvement as an intrusion into free-market mechanisms, which 
should always provide for the optimal use of resources. Therefore, it follows that the refugee 
resettlement apparatus, which is largely viewed as a pillar of public welfare, would be privatized 
as part of a marketization process to both introduce competition into service provision and 
reduce public expenditure on direct aid (Brodkin 2007; Lipsky & Smith 1989; Smith & Lipsky 
1993). 
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The competition among refugee service providers that results from the creation of a 
resettlement market is waged over access to refugees. For fiscal year (FY) 2017, Volags were 
funded approximately $2025 per refugee to provide access to refugee cash assistance, healthcare, 
and employment services, according to a cooperative agreement with the Department of State 
(BPRM 2016). These federal provisions cover two major expenses: the cost of assistance, aid, 
and services provided to refugees, and, when coupled with the capital raised through fundraising 
and private donations, a significant portion of the administrative and human capital costs of 
Volags.  
Rather than allocating a set amount of funding that would cover the costs of resettling a 
known quantity of refugees, the state ties funding to each individual refugee resettled. To the 
resettlement agency, the refugee becomes both client and commodity: an individual in need of 
services, and an economic unit that accounts for institutional solvency. Privatizing and 
decentralizing the resettlement regime introduces competition for the scarce resource of refugees. 
To cope with institutional financial stresses and respond to competition, street-level 
practitioners—those who Lipsky (1980) identified as being tasked with converting social policy 
into action for a target population at the level of implementation—tend to resort to predictable 
survival mechanisms, including devoting more time to fundraising, documenting community 
needs, or reporting program outcomes (Smith & Lipsky 1993). In short, less time and energy is 
spent delivering much needed services, and more time is spent securing the funds necessary to do 
so. 
Furthermore, the inability to plan for the future subjects service providers to the whims of 
a capricious political system. In the United States, the administrative branch can exert totalizing 
influence over the entire refugee apparatus, both in policy formation and in implementation. In 
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recent months, this has meant starving the Volags of the refugees that provide them with 
funding.  
__________ 
I found myself in the tidy office of a resettlement agency, across a small, 
Formica table from a resettlement administrator. It was the day after the Trump 
administration announced that refugee intakes would be capped at 50,000 later that 
week, and all other refugees would not be allowed entry until the end of the fiscal year 
in September. We had already discussed some of the implications of the cap: how the 
time-sensitive health certifications of certain refugees in camps would expire and their 
cases would likely be delayed for months, if not years, more; how an idle file of 
approved health insurance applications and housing requests needed cancellation; 
how families, who had waited years to reconnect with loved ones, were grappling with 
newly introduced uncertainty.  
As the conversation progressed, I asked her about the timeline for securing 
affordable housing, a precious and scarce commodity in the greater Boston area 
where the fair market rent for a two-bedroom apartment is over $1700 (HUD 2017). 
She discussed the necessity of locating housing between the time a case is approved 
for intake and the refugee arrives. 
Oh yeah, you find it before they arrive because if you were to guess 
when someone was going to arrive before you had a travel notification, 
then you could be paying for housing that—oh my goodness. You just 
reminded me that we have to cancel an apartment. 
 
She pulled out her legal pad, filled with notes related to specific cases, 
including from the emergency call that pulled her out of the interview for ten minutes. 
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As she scrawled, “Cancel two bedroom apartment” and underlined it twice for 
emphasis, she said, “We had an apartment that we’ve actually already paid first and 
last months’ rent for that we don’t need anymore.  
“Because there are no more arrivals.” She capped her pen and sighed.  
__________ 
 A fickle and unstable resettlement apparatus is inefficient because a lack of information 
and the inability to plan ahead lead practitioners to waste resources. Not only did the agency 
miss its opportunity to claim funds associated with the resettlement of these refugees, but it also 
had committed both time to find housing and money to pay for it, neither of which would be put 
to productive use. The experience of this official demonstrates the uncertainty that pervades a 
service sector administered by an executive branch that is unreceptive to its international 
obligation to resettle refugees. Upon taking the rei(g)ns of the American resettlement regime, the 
Trump administration drastically reduced the number of refugees admitted to the US. President 
Obama’s pledge to resettle 110,000 refugees in fiscal year 2017—the highest total in American 
history—fell far short as a result. President Trump assumed office and implemented both a 
temporary ban on refugee admissions and an indefinite suspension of visas from a number of 
refugee-sending nations. The final number of refugees resettled in fiscal year 2017 was less than 
half the number Volags had prepared and budgeted for: 53,716 (Refugee Processing Center 
2017). In the greater Boston area, several resettlement agencies that had prepared for a record 
number of refugees and, therefore, a dramatic increase in funding were instead forced to lay off 
workers, limit and economize resource provision, and even consider ceasing participation in the 
R&P program (Parker 2017). International Institute of New England, one of only two Volags to 
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resettle refugees in the North Shore, faced a budget shortage of nearly $300,000—21 percent 
lower than expected (Parker 2017). 
To survive, resettlement agencies must make a strong case that they warrant a sustainable 
caseload of refugees to resettle. As a condition of the federal aid made available in the Refugee 
Act of 1980, the resettlement agencies, in conjunction with state governments, must submit to 
the Secretary of State a plan which describes “how the state intends to encourage effective 
refugee resettlement and to promote economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible” and 
“insure that language training and employment services are made available to refugees receiving 
cash assistance” (Refugee Act of 1980). 
The Refugee Act does not provide a definition for economic self-sufficiency. While self-
sufficiency is not concretely defined, the Act does mandate that refugee service providers 
(Volags and state governments) maintain records, report specific data, and contribute to a report 
to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of public investment in refugee resettlement. By 
analyzing the reporting mandate the Act imposes on service providers, the pillars of “self-
sufficiency” can be gleaned.  
To assess the effectiveness of resettlement funding and service provision, the Act 
requires an annual report to Congress that provides “evaluations of the extent to which … the 
services provided under this subchapter are assisting refugees in achieving economic self-
sufficiency, achieving ability in English, and achieving employment commensurate with their 
skills and abilities…” (ORR 2015: 1). All three main objectives identified in the ORR annual 
report—self-sufficiency, English language ability, and employment—are presented through 
measurable statistics, suggesting that there is a benchmark for each goal that some portion of 
refugees attain. Self-sufficiency is measured by its inverse in terms of refugees’ access of public 
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benefits; language ability is measured in proficiency levels; employment is measured in labor 
force participation and employment rates. Yet aspects of this evaluative process obscure the 
spectral reality of fluid concepts such as employment. While a client may have a job that the 
state or Volag deems “commensurate with their skills and abilities,” the refugee may interpret 
their status either as below their skills and abilities or as underemployment, particularly in a high 
cost-of-living region like the Greater Boston Area. A refugee may be counted as “employed” for 
statistical purposes, when the reality may reflect underemployment or job insecurity. 
Understandings of these evaluative categories are imposed upon refugees rather than self-
reported by them.  
The discounting of local knowledge, or what James Scott (1998: 335) calls metis, 
relinquishes control of the system from those within it and assigns power to the state: “The 
destruction of metis and its replacement by standardized formulas legible only from the center is 
virtually inscribed in the activities of both the state and large-scale bureaucratic capitalism…. 
The logic animating the project, however, is one of control and appropriation.” Scott’s concept 
of “legibility” is premised on measureable metrics that enshrine administrative logics at the 
expense of local logics, privileging the measurements of administrators over the experiences and 
accounts of the public. The resulting metrics are both universal (able to be understood at any 
point within a system) and universalizable (able to be imposed upon any specific context). By 
adhering to a common standard, the state attains the ability to influence structures and systems 
from the top and center, while limiting the influence agents can exert from below. As Heilbron 
(1990: 22-23) writes, this is a particularly evident trend in evolving bureaucratic states: “The 
need for the increasingly bureaucratic state to organize itself and control its resources gave an 
impulse to the collection of vital and other statistics…”.  
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Self-sufficiency marks an arena in which the goal has been defined by the bureaucratic 
metrics used to measure it. For one of its refugee grant programs, the ORR defines self-
sufficiency as  
earning a total family income at a level that enables the case unit to support itself 
without receipt of a cash assistance grant. In practice, this means having earnings 
that exceed the income eligibility level for receipt of a TANF [Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families] cash assistance grant in the state and the ability to 
cover the family living expenses. (ORR 2015: 20) 
 
Self-sufficiency is described in terms of the individual’s eligibility for and use of public 
welfare resources. According to this definition, an individual cannot count as self-sufficient if 
accessing certain types of public welfare.  
Of the three main objectives of refugee resettlement articulated above, the least clearly 
defined and the least measurable statistic, self-sufficiency, is presented as the most important in 
both the Refugee Act and throughout the resettlement regime. Refugee resettlement practitioners 
describe the pressure to achieve self-sufficiency for their clients. While the importance of 
devising a measureable benchmark is key to the legibility of the system, the responsibility for 
both defining and effecting refugee self-sufficiency falls to the resettlement agencies that 
implement policy. 
In the absence of a benchmark for self-sufficiency, practitioners seize upon the concretely 
defined auxiliary goals of the system, as communicated by reporting requirements. The desired 
outcomes are thus conflated with the measurements used to evaluate them. For example, early 
employment and linguistic proficiency become the main goals expressed by refugee resettlement 
practitioners, even though these are merely metrics for the broader goals of self-sufficiency and 
cultural integration. In practice, even these two strands become conflated to achieve a 
measurable success parallel to the federal government’s definition of self-sufficiency; as will be 
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discussed later, language is taught only insofar as it can lead to employment in order to reduce 
dependency on public benefits. In the context of high competition and scarce funding resources, 
statistics and reporting requirements related to state legibility assume vital importance, which 
shapes the ways practitioners make decisions about and resettle refugees in the North Shore. 
 
Defining Self-Sufficiency: Economic Fundamentalism,  
Employment, and the Welfare State 
As Brodkin (1990) notes, the implementation of policy by practitioners should be viewed 
as an extension of the social politics that create it. The distance between policy objective and 
policy outcome, she writes, is not only limited to the arena of policy enactment, but also is 
contested in spaces of implementation. By determining the implementation of refugee 
resettlement, street-level practitioners exert influence on the outcomes of policies (Darrow 
2015a). The delegation of refugee aid administration by the Department of State to the non-profit 
and state-level public sectors enables those who implement the policies the latitude to define its 
objectives. 
The burden of interpreting the objectives outlined by the state is shifted to street-level 
practitioners, upon whom reporting burdens are placed. Lipsky (1980) notes that street-level 
bureaucrats mediate the relationship between clients and the state. He writes that when policy is 
subject to discretionary implementation, as nearly all policies are, practitioners wield significant 
influence over policy outcomes. Within refugee resettlement, as difficulties in implementing 
policy increase with a combination of resource constraints, a non-voluntary clientele, and 
outcome directives which are difficult to measure, practitioners resort to certain coping 
mechanisms that ease performance pressures.  
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I asked one resettlement official what portion of the agency’s cases achieved self-
sufficiency.  
Yeah well it's—I can say that it’s like a hundred percent of the cases. Because our 
newly arrived refugees—well it's like the [window for] cash assistance closes in 
eight months. So it means we have to make sure that they get a job in three 
months. It [failure] only happens with those kind of clients that are disabled. 
 
Having provided basic and urgently-needed services to many refugees that had phased 
out of this Volag’s service provision mandate, I was quite surprised to hear how supposedly self-
sufficient they were. To this official, finding a job is the benchmark of self-sufficiency. The 
official explained how employment, and the income it provides, can lead to a self-sufficient 
lifestyle, featuring a hypothetical refugee named “Client:” 
So when we help them find a job, then there's that improvement to your income. 
That means the client's going into self-sufficiency. It means that the client is not 
coming to ask for food stamps, the client's not coming to ask for cash assistance, 
for any other unearned income. So Client is helping himself. Client is buying a 
car, starting another part time job, supporting the family. Client's buying stuff for 
the house, even. It means that Client's leaving our place that we rented for the 
client. So Client's moving to another place, renting his own house, Client's 
making credit history. Client understands how to make credit history and 
understands how to rent a house or room for his own. That’s improvement and all 
that self-sufficiency implies. 
 
Clearly, the jump from initial employment to the comfortable lifestyle described above 
requires some contortion. But while this response may not serve as a particularly useful 
definition of self-sufficiency, it reveals the importance of employment to the evaluation of 
resettlement success for street-level practitioners. The response can be broken into two 
categories. The first part relates to the refugee’s accessing of public benefits. The second relates 
to the client’s purchasing power. In both, the metrics are economic, revealing the centrality of 
economic measurements in evaluating self-sufficiency and employment as the key to achieving 
it.  
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I contend that employment maintains a central position within the resettlement process 
for two reasons. The first is that it represents an easily measureable policy outcome. All refugees 
enter the country unemployed. The ability to acquire a job for migrants is a positive outcome. In 
a hypercompetitive resettlement environment, employment rates provide metrics that can easily 
be compared against competitors to justify an increased caseload of refugees and, therefore, 
increased funding. The second is that income earned from employment reduces the public 
expense associated with refugee resettlement. The income cap for receipt of public benefits (for 
individuals) is below full-time, minimum wage employment, meaning that taking any minimum 
wage job would disqualify a refugee from receiving cash assistance.  
 Employment fulfills the institutional objectives of both the Volag and the state. For the 
Volag, employment provides a measurable economic metric that contributes to the overarching 
resettlement objective of self-sufficiency. For the state, employment reduces the total amount 
spent on welfare in refugee resettlement. The response of the resettlement official suggests that 
attaining a job, an auxiliary goal in service to the broader ambition of “self-sufficiency,” is, in 
fact, interchangeable with self-sufficiency itself. Furthermore, by employing every refugee and 
claiming a 100 percent self-sufficiency rate for the refugees trusted to their agency’s 
stewardship, the official asserts a claim of superiority to leverage in a competition against other 
resettlement agencies for more refugees—the lifeblood of the resettlement infrastructure. 
 Other practitioners corroborate the stance of the resettlement official. Differentiating their 
own stance from that of the federal government, one Commonwealth resettlement official 
offered:  
I think that the interpretation, especially from a federal perspective, of what self-
sufficiency is is one's capacity to rapidly—the ability to get a job, to keep a job, 
and to overall have an income that would be able to support you and/or your 
family. Being able to live in the region that you're resettled. 
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Self-sufficiency is defined in reference to employment and the income it generates. As 
the conditional funding apparatus incentivizes resettlement agencies to achieve employment 
results, the pressure of the “workfare” state, which ties entitlements to employment objectives, is 
extended to influence not only the refugee recipients of public benefits, but also the decision 
making of street-level organizations and their practitioners (Brodkin 2013; Darrow 2015a). 
 To encourage strong employment outcomes, the resettlement system in the North Shore 
has made several accommodations. The first is tying receipt of services to a maintenance of 
effort requirement. One resettlement practitioner, who works for a Volag, described the process 
for refugee intake. After taking the newly arrived refugee to the housing the Volag has found and 
paid for, a need assessment is completed. The services the Volag will provide are explained, and 
the refugee then signs an agreement to receive services from the resettlement agency.  
But it’s like voluntary—if he doesn't like the services, he can just move on and 
just quit anytime the client wants. Because some clients have money, some clients 
that might have relatives, he wants to move on. They wanted to move on on their 
own, which never happened yet but there's flexibility for the clients to go. 
 
Of course, the concept of choice is illusory. Framing the refugee as a consumer of 
resources, capable of shopping for the best service provider, ignores the reality that the refugee 
will be hard-pressed to find any other agency, which did not receive the federal funds to resettle 
them, to voluntarily provide the vital services Volags offer. Presenting narratives of choice is 
central to the neoliberal project, because it reinforces the apparently inherent nature of the 
market as a fundamental organizer of society while shifting blame for inequalities onto 
individuals who “choose” to be poor. Intersecting with social Darwinist pseudo-theory, Black 
peoples, including Congolese refugees who are implicitly admonished for not “choosing” a 
resettlement agency that provides better services, are disproportionately pathologized for the 
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inequalities they experience which are central to the neoliberal project (George 1999). Though 
inequality is treated as incidental to neoliberalism, in reality it is foundational and fundamental. 
As David Harvey asserts, “Redistributive effects and increasing social inequality have in fact 
been such a persistent feature of neoliberalization as to be regarded as structural to the whole 
project” (Harvey 2005: 16). 
Further illuminating the specious nature of economic choice in the life of the resettled 
refugee is the nature of the relationship between the refugee, the labor market, and the 
resettlement agency. Within the agreement, as reported by another post-resettlement official and 
a refugee, are requirements that make service provision contingent upon agreements to both 
actively seek employment and accept a job that is offered. As I did not obtain an agreement, I 
cannot confirm whether any document contains these terms. But these responses suggest that 
whether or not this provision exists in the signed document, the requirement to seek employment 
and accept any job offered to refugees is being communicated to clients at the level of 
implementation. Such a contract would thus allow the Volag to terminate its services if 
employment is not pursued or is declined, as the service provider can deem the refugee non-
compliant and stop providing services. Refugees would be shuttled into the first employment 
offer extended to them, regardless of their preparedness to work or their satisfaction with its 
terms. 
 In the case management manual provided to participants in the Massachusetts Refugee 
Resettlement Program, early employment is described as “a vital first step toward basic self-
sufficiency” (ORI 2017a: 8). It is also often the point where refugees must forfeit the public 
benefits they receive through refugee cash assistance. This “vital first step” is often an 
unwelcome one for refugees, as one post-resettlement practitioner described.  
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I still sit with them and kind of try to budget things and explain to them that this 
cash assistance you get—it's not going to be forever. And I spent yesterday about 
an hour and a half with a person with this same voice: "I'm not going to make it if 
I take this job. It's not going to be enough for me to pay the rent." Okay. But you 
have to look at the long run. It gives you security. It gives you a safety net. It 
gives you benefits and this and that. "Yeah but I have my family now." So this is 
the hard part.  
 
The practitioner’s conversation with this refugee reveals the shortcomings of using 
employment as a metric of self-sufficiency. Though the refugee will soon achieve employment, 
there are basic economic needs that will not be met with this plan. Counting this case as a 
successful example of a refugee achieving self-sufficiency is tone-deaf at best and dishonest at 
worst. Additionally, in accepting the first job offered, refugees are unable to devote the time to 
attain the qualifications necessary for a job more “commensurate with their skills and abilities.” 
 In addition to the maintenance of effort requirement, the objective of refugee English 
education is not to integrate newcomers into an English-speaking nation, but rather to prepare 
refugees for employment. One Volag administrator explained: 
Our English language classes here are complementary to our employment classes. 
So at this moment, unfortunately, we do not offer full ESL services. We offer 
what is called EFE, it’s English for employment. So we are doing sort of specific, 
targeted English training to help people secure employment or secure job 
upgrades. So someone that’s seeking more comprehensive ESL, they wouldn’t get 
that in our office. They would have to go to another service provider 
 
The specific, targeted English taught by Volags often fails to account for linguistic 
exchanges that might occur outside of low-skill workplaces. “It's vocational English,” one post-
resettlement official said. “It's survival English. It's English to survive to this life. So we kind of 
provide the tools and English what to do and how to do it.” 
Focusing limited English-teaching resources on employment-related training also makes 
it more difficult to navigate other aspects specific to refugee life, including the public benefit and 
healthcare sectors. Survival English does not equip refugees to form self-sufficient or 
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independent communities, and it confines their sphere of interaction to a workplace. A targeted 
approach to English stunts the ability of refugees to interact with native-born Americans, 
refugees from other linguistic backgrounds, or other communities that may help refugees access 
resources or exchange knowledge. Reflecting on his first several months in the US, Clement, a 
male refugee, recalled how, prior to developing English skills through other classes, simple tasks 
like going to the store become much more difficult for refugees who have only been exposed to 
EFE training. 
Or I say, okay so I need this thing and now I can go to the supermarket and buy 
it…. It’s not like before. Before, people were busy and if I asked someone 
something, they wouldn’t understand because you were speaking another 
language. 
 
 The major success of EFE is to concentrate resources into an employment-based 
objective that can be measured, reported, and converted into benefits for resettlement agencies. 
EFE represents a response by resettlement agencies to the stresses of neoliberal competition, 
revealing the priorities of the State through the adaptations of its privatized system. The most 
significant adaptation of the North Shore resettlement environment, however, is not in the ways 
services are provided to clients, but in the demographic composition of client population itself. 
 
Creaming the Cash Crop: Resettling  and Redefining Single Male Refugees 
“I don’t know if you’ve heard about it on the North Shore,” said one post-resettlement 
official. “The resettlement agency has made a decision to bring in single people for mostly 
different reasons. And they put them together—and that's the only way to survive in one 
household.” 
The Boston metropolitan area, in which the North Shore is included, has some of the 
most expensive housing in the United States (HUD 2017). The combined effects of 
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gentrification, urbanization, high property taxes, and discriminatory renting practices make 
housing an incredibly difficult challenge for resettlement practitioners.  
“It is so hard. It’s one of our biggest challenges,” said one resettlement administrator. 
“Part of what you have to consider when you’re renting an apartment isn’t just can we get it at 
the right time, does it have the right amount of bedrooms, but also of our client’s finances. Are 
they going to be able to self-sustain this?”  
One post-resettlement official identified the rent increases resulting from gentrification as 
“the biggest problem we have”: 
Even now, people that have the means and money, they are buying properties 
here. And it’s very difficult for our refugees here not only to have an apartment, 
but the rent is skyrocketing. The price is going up and up. And the salary, some of 
them don’t even have a job. So it’s very difficult for them to keep it up…. We 
have a solution, but it’s a short-term solution. Some of them, especially men, they 
have what we call shared apartment, so you could see two people in one room. 
And if the cost is 500, everyone is chipping in 250. That’s how this problem will 
be solved.  
 
Resettling individual refugees allows for cost-sharing not only within an apartment, but 
within a bedroom. Two refugees of the same gender can cohabit a bedroom and split the cost, 
halving the price of housing per refugee.  
 Housing refugees in this way enables a more efficient and cost-effective expenditure on 
rent. Volags can resettle a higher volume of refugees while improving the financial standing of 
each one. Shared housing of individual refugees is the ideal solution for conceptions of the 
refugee as homo economicus: consumers of scarce resources with limited capital available. 
Emphasizing the individual as the relevant unit of economic decision-making centers the concept 
of choice. Meillassoux wrote on the creation of homo economicus: “the principle explanation of 
the economic phenomenon is to be found in the behavior of individuals and boils down to a 
problem of consumers’ attitudes” (Meillassoux 1972: 95). Narrowing analysis to the level of the 
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individual makes consumer choice and preference the variables that determine economic status, 
diminishing the impact of structures that limit the ability of agents to freely choose among 
available options. A resettlement official, discussing the practice of rooming individual refugees 
together, emphasizes the benefits of shared housing while mentioning (and perhaps overstating) 
the capacity of refugees to choose their living situations: 
In this case these decisions are being made without you and oftentimes it's—
oftentimes it's amazing and works very well and groups of roommates become 
very, like a family and they're supporting each other. And in some cases there are 
conflicts and managing those conflicts becomes a real role of the, of the case 
specialist and sometimes people choose to not keep living together or they meet 
other people after they resettle here and they become better friends with them and 
get apartments together. 
 
By emphasizing positive outcomes and the decisions of certain refugees to remain in 
cohabitant residences, the official minimizes the fact that “these decisions are being made 
without” refugees. They do not initially choose to share a bedroom with another person. Yet the 
rhetoric of choice pervades throughout responses, reflecting the centrality of bounded economic 
decision-making in resettlement.  
Resettlement agencies note other benefits to accepting individual cases. Other rationales 
for resettling individuals fall in line with scripts related to self-sufficiency. A Commonwealth 
resettlement official said: 
[S]ingles in most cases tend to become self-sufficient more quickly since they 
don’t have a family to support and can tend to live together in roommate 
situations, which can just go very well for them as individuals, and also 
economically. It just tends to work out. They can just tend to get on their feet 
more quickly.  
 
This response positions the family as a drain on resources, and, therefore, an economic 
barrier to self-sufficiency. The administrator states that rooming together has both personal and 
economic benefits. But in assessing the benefits of assigning multiple refugees to a room, a 
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divide emerges between resettlement and post-resettlement officials. When I asked a post-
resettlement official about these benefits, I received instead a list of difficulties that arise. 
People may not know each other, I mean, even if people are brothers, friends, 
sometimes friends do have problems. So now can you imagine people who do not 
know each other who have to share an apartment? There could be—this one could 
be blaming the other one for not being clean. There’s always some small 
problems. 
 
Another post-resettlement leader shared the views of their clients: 
We see people we resettle in Lynn. How many of them expected old houses? 
Shared living? You know, lack of resources? How many of them, especially when 
I served my first Iraqi families, they were crying here in this very office saying we 
fought for this. We were caught in the middle. We had businesses, we had 
everything back there. We came here and believed in this. We live in this small 
apartment with nothing basically with so limited resources. 
 
 The shared living that has become a fixture of individual resettlement alleviates certain 
economic pressures from refugees, but they amplify a number of social costs. Refugees report 
that sharing a bedroom is dehumanizing, suffocating, and stressful. These non-measureable, non-
economic stressors are rendered invisible by a system that prioritizes efficient spending of 
resources, maximum number of refugees settled within a locality, and economic indicators of 
resettlement performance, all while distancing the effects of structural inequalities by presenting 
them as decisions made by refugees themselves. 
 Additionally, there has been a preference exhibited for men to be resettled. Jessica 
Darrow (2015b) notes that gender is a relevant variable in employment outcomes for refugees, 
with maleness being associated with higher earnings. An ORR report (2015) finds that for the 
years 2011-2015, males (relative to females) have dramatically higher employment rates (69.0 to 
39.0), higher labor force participation rates (75.7 to 45.7), and lower unemployment rates (8.8 to 
16.2). Male refugees are much more likely to secure employment. 
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 The ability to provide shared living accommodations and the relative ease with which 
individual male refugees attain initial employment comprise the basis of Volag support for 
individual male resettlement. The resources of the resettlement agency are thus invested in a 
carefully selected population that has been curated by Volags to be the most employable, least 
resource intensive, and most likely to result in favorable economic outcomes. The street-level 
practice of funneling resources to those clients who are most likely to succeed is called 
“creaming” (Darrow 2015b). A key distinction of the resettlement apparatus, though, is that 
creaming occurs not as a result of selecting the best from within a pre-defined population, but by 
selecting and defining the population itself.  
 Local resettlement agencies, like the ones that resettle refugees within the North Shore, 
are affiliates of NRAs. As local affiliates, they are able to exert a measure of control over the 
populations they are assigned to resettle. At the national level, the allocation of refugees 
throughout the country is determined by three stakeholders: the NRAs, the US Department of 
State, and IOM (International Organization for Migration), the international agency that links 
refugees in camps with resettlement agencies around the world. The NRAs receive allocations of 
refugees and then recommends cases for particular local Volag affiliates. These affiliates then 
make a decision on the cases: they either assure the case and agree to resettle the refugee(s) 
associated with it, or they choose not to assure the case and the NRA seeks another affiliate to 
assure the case.  
In the Boston area, the local affiliates almost always assure the cases assigned to them. 
While street-level bureaucrats have the power and mechanisms to alter and refuse established 
policy, they instead exert influence prior to the formation of policy. In other words, rather than 
changing the policy dictated by decision-makers, street-level organizations arrange for their 
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preferences to be written into policy at the time of refugee case allocation, obviating the need to 
turn away cases. NRAs understand the resource constraints of the Boston area and recommend 
mostly individual cases for resettlement to Boston affiliates. The NRA attempts to create a 
portfolio of refugee cases such that the Volag does not need to turn any cases away. In this way, 
the local context for refugee resettlement influences decision-making at the national level. But 
the influence of the local context extends further into the global sphere as well, affecting the 
decision-making and displacement narratives of refugees in pre-resettlement as well. Analyzing 
this phenomenon suggests the presumption that single refugees lack family to support proves too 
simplistic. 
 
Petier, one of the single male refugees resettled to the North Shore, walked 
into my office radiating exuberance. He had just completed two weeks of training for a 
good paying job—$20 an hour, of which he got to keep $16 after he paid dues to the 
contracting firm that connected him with the employer. We were conducting our 
second interview, and he let his fantasies wander. He spoke of finally having the 
money to hire a lawyer and expedite the family reunification process, of looking into 
modest homes (his four daughters could share two rooms, right?) and investing the 
money he now spent on rent in a mortgage. He had just started to tell me about 
Kenya, where his wife and daughters lived, when his phone rang. 
He lost his coveted job while sitting in front of me.  
You know a man’s life depends on his job. I told you, I have a family. So 
I already planned. You know, even today, I sent my sister $100 today. 
You have to help. They told me they don’t have food. Food. They don’t 
have—I can show you. 
 
He dug a receipt out of his pocket. 
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From Western Union. Today. Before he turned me in. Here. This is from 
Western Union today. I sent a hundred dollars today. And now, in the 
job, they are saying that no job. So how am I going to help my family 
now? 
 
Because in Africa you cannot find these kinds of things. Without any 
reason you stop someone’s job? And yet he has fixed—you know in 
Africa once you have a job you start planning your life through that 
job….Because here, you can die. You think like this, it goes like this. 
Just for no reason. No reason! No reason. Just they stop you. How? 
And how am I going to pay the rent? It’s terrible. 
 
Petier paused to pull out his phone. He planned to call his now former co-worker, an 
Ethiopian refugee, to hatch a plan to gain employment. 
Complicated! Complicated, you can’t understand. You are driving a car 
but you are seeing the road. But the car is not going where you want it 
to go. It is not going that way. You crash.  
 
He closed his eyes. We kept talking. He told me he wouldn’t tell his wife; a man 
cannot involve a woman in such matters. She would start to worry. 
Who is going to help me to pay my rent? Nobody. Nobody. Ah! Ehh… 
Sometimes I always wonder not—why? I always wonder why, which 
kind of life is this? You know, jumping jobs is no good. It is not that I am 
willing to jump jobs, but the jobs are willing to jump me. 
 
________ 
 
The reality for many of the single male Congolese refugees that seek resettlement in the 
United States is that they are not “single” at all. Many maintain transnational kinship ties to 
spouses, children, and relatives back in Africa. Through a social network of knowledge sharing 
and rumors, the preference for individual male refugees is communicated to refugees in the pre-
resettlement process in camps. In their pre-screening process, male refugees are advised to either 
present as single or file an individual case to expedite their resettlement.  
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 Claude, a refugee, proposed to his girlfriend while his resettlement case was being 
processed. He told the UNHCR officials that he planned to marry his fiancée prior to being 
resettled. He remembers the officials telling him that changing his marital status could delay his 
departure. “They said, ‘If you put your wife right now, you’re going to stay again five years or 
even six years.’” Claude waited, got married after his paperwork was processed per the officials’ 
advice, and was able to reunite with his wife 18 months after his arrival.  
 Like Claude, Gilbert met his wife as a refugee. He was not yet married, so he applied as a 
single case refugee. He remembers seeking the advice of UN resettlement workers in the camp. 
I was already passed through the process, so I asked the, the people of UNHCR. 
They said it should be better for you to go over there and fight for her to come 
over. If you just put it in your paperwork right now, it will delay. Yeah. We'll start 
over. Yeah. And you have to make it so you understand it. I have a year, a year 
and four weeks now over here. So the paperwork is already there. She will already 
get approved. I'm just waiting for it to work. We'll just start the interview over 
there and then she will be. 
 
 Jean-Claude received the same advice, but his circumstances are not as fortunate. He was 
already married at the time his case was processed for resettlement, and was convinced to list 
himself as single and leave the rest of his family out of the paperwork. He was quickly resettled, 
but now may be unable to access channels for family reunification because he made false 
statements on his migration forms.  
Last time my child, she was sick when—she was sick. And my mom, she was 
sick. I think to start to take care of my child, to start to take care of my mom, to 
start to take care of my younger sister. I said, OK. So I was thinking it's hard to 
me because here in America, when you were a single, it's so hard to you. Back 
home, at least you have your wife and child. 
  
He reports getting frequent seizures, causing him to miss work and incur substantial 
medical bills. He attributes his ailment in part to the stress of separation from his wife and his 
three-year-old daughter. Several respondents associate physical health breakdowns with the 
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trauma of separation from their families, from headaches to insomnia to digestive issues. 
Cameroonian scholar Tatah Mentan, writing on African spirituality, connects physical illness in 
African populations with alienation from traditional familial units: “sickness is an imbalance of 
the body and on one’s social life which can be linked to a breakdown in one’s kinship and family 
relations” (Mentan 2017: 211). Isolated refugees locate the social stresses of familial dislocation 
corporeally, affecting their livelihoods by necessitating expensive medical procedures and 
preventing them from maintaining employment. These physical costs are hidden from view in a 
system that values measureable, economic indices of success. 
  By resettling “single” men, the agencies are not always, in reality, choosing a population 
with no family to support. Instead, they are displacing the familial responsibility of the male 
parent, exacerbating the challenges of providing for their kin. Mothers who are not resettled are 
exploited through the unpaid labor of child-rearing. Resettled husbands and fathers still send 
money to their families, but the cost is hidden as a personal expense associated with “non-
essential” income, or money that does contribute directly to the means of survival for the 
refugee. The resettled men must draw from desperately scarce capital to provide material support 
for their families. 
The separation of Black males from their families has historical roots in capital 
accumulation. Tracing the same pathways from continental Africa to North America followed by 
today’s refugees, the transatlantic slave trade wrenched families apart and reorganized kinship to 
serve maximally (re)productive purposes (Collins 2005: 56). In the late-19th century, when the 
Congo was under the colonial rule of King Leopold, Belgian forces would kidnap wives and 
children, holding them hostage until men harvested a set quota of rubber (Hochschild 1999: 161). 
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In the pursuit of cheap, compliant Congolese labor, the Congolese family has long been a target 
of separation. 
By fragmenting the family, the cost of providing for the family becomes the 
responsibility of the individual rather than the state. Many migrants are ineligible for a number of 
social services until after five years of residency in the United States (Mathema, West, and 
Fremstad 2017). But if immigrants were more eligible for public benefits and families remained 
intact, the household size of refugee cases would increase. As the household size increases, so, 
too, does the minimum income for access of public benefits. Even with a low-paying job, refugee 
families with larger household sizes would be able to support a family if they could access 
additional channels for family funding, including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF), the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), 
and other public benefits geared toward the family. It is conceivable that self-sufficiency for such 
refugees may include some form of public assistance or public benefit. Yet such a conception 
would contradict formulations of self-sufficiency that rely on minimal public expenditure. 
Instead of a sustainable option for stability that makes use of public resources, support for 
families is not accounted for in a resettlement regime that places the individual as the unit of 
policy.  
While it is almost certainly not the intent of resettlement agencies to alter the migratory 
pathways and decision-making of male refugees and lead them to abandon their families, the 
preferences of street-level practitioners leads males to present as single for easier resettlement. 
The resettlement regime fractures the Black family, creating a “single” male individual whose 
employability, flexibility, and need for immediate capital produces a compliant laborer that fits 
neatly into the capitalist economy.  
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Refugee resettlement in the US, spurred by the imbricated structures of society, creates 
circumstances that encourage male family figures to leave their families. Those who are parents 
thus become “absent fathers,” echoing a controlling image of that emphasizes a supposed 
tendency of Black men to abandon families and abdicate familial responsibilities. Sincere 
researchers have framed this alleged phenomenon as a product of cultural values, pathologizing 
poor Black communities while providing only a gesture to structural factors that constrain the 
choices of minority actors. Mercer Sullivan’s 1989 piece, entitled “Absent Fathers in the Inner 
City,” attempts to break away from framings of the “culture of poverty” to explain the less-
explored, supposedly more veracious cultural values and responses of Black communities, 
including in the Brooklyn neighborhood pseudonymously dubbed “Projectville,” to the problem 
of absent fathers. While Sullivan advocates for policies that move beyond “assumptions that 
uncontrolled sexuality and an undeveloped work ethic are at the root of the problem” (Sullivan 
1989: 58), using thinly-veiled dog-whistle identifiers like “inner-city” and “Projectville” 
associates the problem of absent-fathers with Black peoples while eliding structural conditions 
that concentrate poverty within minority neighborhoods. The result is that the absent father is 
uncritically presented as the product of a cultural Other. Such scholarship appeals to stereotypes 
that equate Blackness with a culture of poverty, evoking ideations of race that shift the blame of 
poverty and inequality on the poor. These controlling images, which, as Chapter 3 will 
demonstrate, racialize social programs and create barriers to access for the receipt of welfare 
benefits by Black peoples, define the landscape into which Black Congolese single men resettle. 
Because of the challenges associated with cost-of-living, housing, and sustainable 
employment, the preferences at the level of implementation lead to a resettled population in the 
North Shore that is more likely to be employed and the less likely to be eligible for long-term 
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public benefits. These preferences are communicated through the various phases of the global 
refugee resettlement regime, changing the decision-making of refugees in the pre-resettlement 
process. And, when the refugee is a parent, these channels of communication shift the burden of 
family responsibility from the state to the lone resettled refugee. In addition to the economic 
costs imposed upon refugees, the stresses of separation take a significant toll that can be charted 
in responses of poor mental, emotional, and physical health. 
 
Conclusion 
 The street-level decision-making of resettlement agencies should be called into question 
for contributing to a system that introduces stresses into the lives of refugees in pursuit of 
favorable economic metrics. But resettlement agencies are not solely responsible for this 
outcome. The neoliberal, privatized system of resettlement, which positions the refugee as both 
indigent client and precious commodity, necessitates certain survival tactics in a local 
geopolitical context that has high rents, scarce employment opportunities, and a high cost-of-
living. The competitive market inevitably results in a system that privileges a population that is 
highly employable, easily integrated into a difficult housing context, and least eligible for public 
benefits. A performance-based system of competition inevitably leads to an emphasis on 
economic measurements, rendering invisible the non-economic human costs of pursuing 
economic fundamentalism. And a resettlement architecture based on minimizing public 
expenditure inevitably results in a resettlement regime that places the individual, and not a 
collective groups such as the community or the family, as the unit of policy targeting. 
 The ways in which resettlement organizations respond to and cope with the specific 
resettlement challenges particular to the North Shore lead to changes in the resettlement regime 
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on both the global and local level. The ramifications of these migratory changes are left for other 
agencies to solve. Post-resettlement refugee community organizations, which operate largely 
outside of the hypercompetitive neoliberal resettlement regime, are well-positioned to address 
community-wide needs that result from the stresses of resettlement, dislocation, and 
fragmentation. Now that the context for refugees has been established, the next chapter will 
examine the role of the Congolese Development Center in resettlement and post-resettlement for 
Congolese refugees in the North Shore. 
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Chapter 3 
“My friend is my job”: Understandings of the CDC,  
community, and social cohesion 
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In what became a fairly regular ritual during my three months working with the CDC, 
Eric burst into my office with a handful of papers and an air of exasperation. On this occasion, 
Placide, one of our elderly clients who is illiterate in his native Swahili and speaks virtually no 
English, had his application for disability supplemental security income (SSI) benefits denied. Of 
the several doctors providing his healthcare, one had failed to sign the document that Eric had 
sent to them, included alongside clear instructions for properly completing the forms and passing 
them along for review. Placide, who suffered from splenic dysfunction that, along with advanced 
age and language inabilities, prevented him from finding a job, had recently become ineligible 
for cash assistance from the Massachusetts Department of Transitional Assistance (DTA). His 
time on public benefits was up. He either needed SSI, or he needed to find a job. 
The previous day Placide had come into my office, a sure sign that his preferred service 
provider, “Papa Eric,” was in the field. Through a combination of hand gestures, Google 
translate, and my very limited Swahili knowledge, I was able to deduce that he was low on 
money and needed the SSI. It appeared urgent. He pulled out the smart phone he feared losing 
the ability to pay for—it was the only way he had to contact his wife in the refugee camp, he 
said—and opened the DTA app, which showed the money in his bank account. He was left with 
$0.32 to his name. 
“You see, people think it is easy to get disability,” Eric said, brandishing the rejection 
papers as evidence against this argument. “But it is not easy. Now, you tell me—what is he 
supposed to do? What would he do without us?” 
__________ 
Eric often directed my attention to facets of his work, as if he wanted to ensure that I 
made note of certain information. He seemed keenly aware of my presence as a researcher, and 
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appeared eager to shape my understanding of the topic. In the anecdote listed above, this meant 
ensuring that my perspective enabled me to invert the dominant narrative surrounding refugee 
resettlement: that refugees consume a substantial sum of public resources and often become a 
“public charge.” The USCIS calculates the likelihood of becoming a public charge in 
determining “admissibility” of migrants or naturalization of citizens, offering the following 
definition: 
For purposes of determining inadmissibility, “public charge” means an individual 
who is likely to become primarily dependent on the government for subsistence, 
as demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash assistance for income 
maintenance or institutionalization for long-term care at government expense. 
(USCIS 2017) 
 
The fallacy that refugees represent a cost to citizens and taxpayers has recently been 
thrust into the national rhetoric with the anti-immigrant, anti-refugee extremism of the Donald 
Trump presidency. On March 6, 2017, Trump sent a memorandum to then-Secretary of State 
Rex Tillerson, then-Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly, and Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions (who, as of this writing, has not yet been fired or re-assigned). The memo mandated the 
production of: 
a report estimating how many refugees are being supported in countries of first 
asylum (near their home countries) for the same long-term cost as supporting 
refugees in the United States, taking into account the full lifetime cost of Federal, 
State, and local benefits, and the comparable cost of providing similar benefits 
elsewhere. (Trump 2017: 3) 
 
Of course, embedded in this language is a fixation on the cost of domestic refugee 
resettlement without any reference to potential benefits, economic or otherwise. The presumption 
that refugee resettlement represents a superfluous burden for the “average American taxpayer” (a 
lightly coded appeal to whiteness and the protection of white wealth) rejects the reality of 
resettlement. Long-term studies of refugee populations disprove the suggestion that refugees are 
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voracious consumers of public benefits. The racialization of the refugee, who is inherently 
viewed as an “other” inserting herself into American society, harkens depictions of controlling 
images of people of color accessing public welfare. In particular, the “welfare queen” image was 
central to racial reforms of welfare that project blame onto a pathologized poor and distract from 
the structural inequalities inherent in society. Ange-Marie Hancock (2003: 36) writes that the 
welfare queen represents an “indigent version of the Black matriarch controlling image…a 
dominant mother responsible for the moral degeneracy of America.” Scholars like Wahneema 
Lubiano, drawing from conceptions of unruly Black female dominance detailed in the Moynihan 
Report on the “Negro family,” have connected the stereotype to a so called “culture of poverty:” 
Within the terms specifically of, or influenced by, the Moynihan Report and 
generally of the discourse on the “culture of poverty,” welfare queen is a phrase 
that describes economic dependency—the lack of a job and/or income (which 
equals degeneracy in the United States); the presence of a child or children with 
no father and/or husband (moral deviance); and finally, a charge on the collective 
U.S. Treasury—a human debit. (Lubiano 1992: 337-338) 
 
Other stereotypes, including the “welfare loafer” (Gilens 1999: 66), presume that the 
“undeserving poor” grow accustomed to welfare benefits, which obviate the need to find gainful 
employment. Patricia Hill Collins writes that controlling images like the welfare queen and the 
welfare loafer are “key in maintaining interlocking systems of race, class, and gender” (1990: 
68). Indeed, such images are also key in influencing policy. Ideations surrounding both race and 
the erosion of the Black family, coupled with sexual politics and policing of welfare recipients, 
can be seen in the “four purposes” of one public benefit: TANF, or Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families. The four purposes of TANF are to: 
1. Provide assistance to needy families so that children can be cared for in their 
own homes. 
2. Reduce the dependency of needy parents by promoting job preparation, work 
and marriage. 
3. Prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies. 
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4. Encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. (Office of 
Family Assistance 2017) 
 
The four purposes of TANF locate the causes of poverty, which drive one to seek public 
benefits, in the family and the sexual practices of welfare recipients. When coupled with the 
hyper-racialized rhetoric surrounding welfare benefits, the effect is to blame the very need for 
welfare on sexual and familial practices—components of some supposed “culture of poverty.” 
As the last chapter details, it is the refugee resettlement apparatus and the employment 
objectives of the state, and not the culture of Black peoples, that contributes to the separation of 
Black families in refugee resettlement. Forcing refugees to maintain transnational kinship ties 
shift the burden of providing for the family from the state to the individual, eliminating the need 
for family-directed welfare for single-case refugees. The structure of the global economy, which 
influences the policy practices of the state, not only pathologizes Black sexuality and family 
structures; it destroys the family unit to alienate workers from social bonds that might interfere 
with the neoliberal, nation-state project of welfare restriction and capital accumulation. 
The state erects barriers that make it difficult for people to access public benefits and 
ensure that those who do receive such benefits truly are worthy. In refugee resettlement, this 
takes place through both the narratives of displacement that frame “refugeeness” (Malkki 1995), 
and an extreme vetting procedure (which has, under the Trump administration, become 
downright draconian). If, against the odds, the refugee is selected for resettlement into the United 
States, she is entitled to funding distributed by her resettlement agency. But the benefits are 
temporary, and the barriers to welfare access continue to affect refugees like Placide. By 
highlighting the difficulty in obtaining SSI benefits, I believe Eric wanted to dispel the 
presumption that refugees are freely granted economic benefits via an expansive welfare system. 
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The reality is that refugees represent an economic benefit to society. The very report that 
Donald Trump demanded in the above memorandum proved that refugees provide over $63 
billion more in government revenues than their resettlement costs. The draft of this Trump 
administration report lauded the entrepreneurship of refugees, the boosts to rustbelt economies 
(which have experienced population decline following the dismantling of organized labor in the 
1980s), and the contributions of refugees to civic society (New York Times 2017). These 
findings, however, were never made public, as the Trump administration rejected the draft and 
refused to publish the report. 
Yet despite the revenue (and government profits) that refugees contribute, the fear of the 
“public charge” is projected onto Black refugee bodies. In a private meeting on migration with 
lawmakers, President Trump allegedly lamented the practice of accepting migrants from places 
like Haiti and Africa, referring to these as “shithole countries” (despite the fact that Africa is a 
continent) and expressing a preference for migrants from countries like Norway (Dawsey 2018). 
The president’s comments cannot be separated from equations of Haiti—the first Black republic 
and a target of racist rhetoric, symbolism, and policy for American presidents from Jefferson to 
Lincoln (Horne 2015)—and Africa with Blackness, and the equation of Norway with whiteness. 
In advocating instead for a merit-based system and an end to the long-standing US practice of 
family reunification (which he calls “chain migration”), President Trump seeks to redefine 
migration according to racial-class identity. The supposed fear is that migrants will not 
assimilate, will represent a drain on public resources, and will overwhelm white Americans, 
fundamentally changing the ethnic, cultural, and social composition of the United States 
(Huntington 2004). The fear, in essence, is that the white privilege upon which the United States 
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is built will erode with the admission of non-white migrants. Poet W.H. Auden captures the 
public perception of refugees in his poem “Refugee Blues:” 
Came to a public meeting; the speaker got up and said; 
"If we let them in, they will steal our daily bread": 
He was talking of you and me, my dear, he was talking of you and me. (Auden 
1962: 256-257). 
 
I hesitate to justify the admission of refugees in terms of their many contributions to 
society, because it simply inverts the narrative while retaining the damaging perceptions that 
frame our toxic discourse on migration. Activist Brittney Packnett expressed the basis for 
valuing the humanity of migrants from so-called “shithole countries”: 
I know it’s tempting to spend a lot of time defending Haiti and Africa by 
displaying all of the success stories from said places. I get it. I’m just not 
participating. I don’t owe Donald Trump anything. Least of all an explanation of 
my humanity. Running to present images of Haiti and Africa that “dispel the 
myth” give entirely too much credence to a preposterous premise in the first 
place. In fact, the question doesn’t need to be dignified with that response. Sadly, 
white supremacy has never been dismantled, shaken or rattled by displays of 
individual achievement by people of color.1 
 
While it is necessary to visit the history of race, welfare, and migration to provide context 
for domestic resettlement policies and attitudes, countering the erroneous conceptions that frame 
refugee resettlement debates legitimizes racist arguments. 
Eric’s comments in my office led me to think more deeply about the role of the CDC in 
the community. The questions that animated my research, however, were not those related to the 
link between the RCO and state benefits. Surely the CDC plays an important role in service 
provision and technical knowledge, but the function of the CDC as an RCO can provide only a 
very limited perspective on how it impacts the life of refugees like Placide. Instead, I direct my 
                                                      
1 Brittney Packnett’s Twitter page, accessed April 8, 2018, https://twitter.com/MsPackyetti/status/951845862430429186. 
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focus to the latter part of his statement: “What is he supposed to do? What would he do without 
us?” 
Placide came to the office nearly every day, sometimes sitting for hours in Eric’s office, 
chatting with one of the few people he knew who shared his language while waiting to be helped. 
The challenges of integrating into American life were compounded for Placide as someone who 
lacks literacy, familiarity with English, the youth and health necessary to find a job, and a 
network of individuals upon whom to rely for assistance. There are difficulties that Placide faces, 
and he turns to the CDC to address them. He needed the CDC to manage. This was clear. Less 
clear is the extent to which the CDC depends on Placide, and other members of the community, 
to survive. How would Placide survive without the CDC? And how would the CDC survive 
without clients like Placide? 
To understand the link between survival—both individual/communal, on the part of the 
refugees, and institutional, on the part of the CDC—the relationship between the refugees and 
the RCO must be further examined. 
 
Understandings of the CDC and Direct Service Provision 
Overwhelmingly, the Congolese clients of the CDC are happy with the services that the 
organization provides. Responses relating to service provision were consistent with the role 
described by the Massachusetts Office of Refugees and Immigrants (ORI) for ethnic-community 
based Mutual Assistance Associations (MAAs): 
Through grants administered by MORI, MAAs provide Social Adjustment 
Services, including Post-Resettlement Community Services (PRCS), and Youth 
Adjustment Services (YAS). Direct services may include helping an individual to 
schedule an appointment, enroll in a class, fill out an application form or 
understand a letter from their child's school…. 
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These organizations provide programs, including English classes, job training, 
mental health support, civic education, and others those refugee community 
members need to succeed in their new lives in the United States. (ORI 2017b) 
 
The refugees report that they are pleased with the services provided to them. Clement, a 
male refugee in his thirties who speaks limited English, explained the types of services the CDC 
provides. 
They helped me to learn how to start—how to go to the store, how to pay money 
for transport, to take the bus. They have helped me with food stamps because I 
didn’t work so they helped me. Also they bring me to the hospital, and with 
medicine. 
 
Often, responses would center around mediating complex government processes. One of 
the most unique services that the CDC provides is support for notoriously complicated family 
reunification applications, including in the petition for Gilbert’s wife. 
Yeah, for me to get like the paperwork for my green card, everything—he’s the 
one who sent the paperwork to Texas, and all the paperwork. Then after that the 
paperwork comes, but to my mail, if I get something like a receipt, he have to 
translate it. I get this and this and this. What should I do with that? He told me. 
Wait, they'll call you or wait. They'll send you the address where you're going to 
your interviews that they were to ask. So, it's mostly like paperwork that you get 
and you don't know what to do with. Yeah, everything paperwork that I was 
telling him I needed a new job. He always explained to me about life in Boston, 
how to survive. You work hard. He teaches me everything. 
 
In addition to helping refugees navigate certain processes, Gilbert’s response reveals how 
the organization provides knowledge specific to the local region of resettlement. Additionally, 
through providing insights on how to survive in Boston, the organization provides support 
beyond the mandate detailed by ORI. The CDC often provides material support, for which they 
have little (if any) budget, when clients like Jean-Claude are struggling to survive. 
Viviane, she always liked me. Viviane and Eric, they are a good person and 
sometimes me, I don't have food here. I can call sister Viviane. She could come. 
She buys food and everything. Sometimes I don't have money to pay for my food. 
I can call Eric where sister Vivian and they could help me to pay my phone. Gives 
me something. 
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Alice, an older refugee woman, noted the support Viviane provided after a trip to the hospital. 
Viviane has helped me. [A home health aide and a volunteer], they’ve helped us 
with papers, with our problems, all the problems that have come with this country. 
If we have a problem with, for example, responding to papers, I call Viviane, I 
call [the aide or volunteer]. After I was in the hospital, it was Mama Viviane who 
brought me water to drink, food.  
 
Providing material support beyond the mandate, caring for the sick, and visiting with 
clients all extend the services offered by the CDC beyond the roles of an MAA enumerated by 
ORI. I interpret these acts of community as providing culturally and linguistically appropriate 
care, a benefit of MAAs. Congolese cultural values may lead the CDC to pursue certain forms of 
care. Alice noticed a difference between American and Congolese cultures: 
But here, you all live according to the laws of the nation. If you work, you are 
fine. You are good. But if you don’t work, who is going to give you money? I 
don’t see anyone who is going to give money to someone. But back home, even if 
you just have five dollars, someone comes and says, “Grandmother, I didn’t eat at 
my home. My children have not eaten.” I will take those five dollars and I’m 
going to change it. I’ll give two dollars to him and leave myself three dollars. “Go 
with that. Have your wife cook a meal for your children.” Back home, it’s like 
that. But here, in your country! (Laughs.) Bad bad bad. 
 
Sharing resources and ensuring that members of the community have enough is central to 
Alice’s framing of Congolese culture. It is reflected in the purchase of groceries or the payment 
of an outstanding phone bill. In addition to providing culturally appropriate care, the CDC 
teaches skills to refugees, enabling them to develop independence and perform functions 
necessary for survival in the US. Speaking through a translator in her native Lutenda, Patricia, a 
single mother of six who was resettled over a year ago, explained how a translator, whom she 
described as an employee of the CDC, helped with an array of actions that are necessary for 
refugee life. 
[Translator:] When she first gets the food stamps, she starts with food stamps in 
the house for like two weeks and then she showed the translator—and then the 
   
 
 
 
 
85 
translator showed them how to use it. She took the number down and put it in the 
phone. Like if you wanna know how much money you have on the food stamps 
you gotta use the phone. She showed her how to use it. Then he took her to the 
bank and showed her how to get money from the cash. Then she took her to the 
market and showed her how to buy food with it. 
 
Praises of the CDC are often contrasted against dissatisfaction with the care provided by 
resettlement agencies. Patricia’s translator, for example, filled a key need for her service 
provision. She reports that her caseworker often did not interact with her. 
[Translator:] She’s saying that the translator did a lot of work because she would 
usually see the translator and not the caseworker. Like the caseworker she saw 
more than five times or less, only five times. But the translator, she saw her 
almost every day for two years and a few months. 
 
For several refugees, much of the frustration with resettlement agencies centers on the 
strictly enforced time limits that dictate when services from resettlement agencies end. It is 
important to note that not all sections of the resettlement regime are subject to the same policies. 
Post-resettlement agencies differ from providers of R&P (Volags) in several key ways. First, 
they often receive funding from state-level, rather than federal, funding streams. The state funds 
that post-resettlement agencies access often take the form of project-specific grants, providing a 
fixed amount of money that is not dependent upon refugee intakes. Both, of course, raise money 
through private donations as well. Second, the post-resettlement agencies that comprise the 
MAA coalition tend to focus on a specific ethnic or regional community, positioning the 
community, and not the individual refugee, as the target of service provision. Whereas 
resettlement cases are either individuals or family units, post-resettlement broadens the scope to 
the level of the community. Third, MAAs tend to be more lenient with service provision 
mandates. R&P providers receive federal funds for 90 days of services, and resettlement 
agencies have mandates of eight months (or twelve months for priority cases), after which 
refugees become ineligible for material assistance, and 60 months for case management 
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responsibilities2 (ORI 2017a). Post-resettlement agencies, though technically subject to the same 
60-month mandate, tend to work with clients even after the mandate has expired. While still 
subject to reporting requirements, government audits tend to only occur for specific programs 
that receive state funds. 
I asked several practitioners about the expiration of mandates for resettlement agencies. 
The decision to move on from cases of refugees is framed in terms of organizational priorities. 
Refugees who have been in the country longer are considered lower priority than recent arrivals, 
presumably because, as one resettlement official states, they have been receiving funds for a 
longer period of time: 
So, when three months after arrival when they get the job they make money. And 
after one year they are now self-sufficient. They are stable. And then we have new 
people added that year. We have we are following new people and these people 
they are now, they are now kind of they are running their own fields and then they 
still follow with them. But they wouldn't be the priorities now because they have 
enrolled in all the services they are receiving English classes and, like, their 
children are going to school. So that's the priority will be the new arrivals. 
 
The assumption made by this official, true to functionalist idealism, is that once refugees 
have been connected with services and enough time has elapsed, the refugee will be on her way 
to self-sufficiency. The problem is that not all respondents arrive equally prepared to integrate 
into the US economy and culture. For some, like Gilbert, the mandate is sufficient. He arrived in 
the US having spent time in Zimbabwe, where he picked up the national language of English. As 
a young male in his early twenties with language skills, he was able to find a job in two weeks. 
His evaluation of his resettlement agency is quite positive. 
I didn't know nothing about it that they say they buy me a bed, they buy from me 
plates, whatever. And then I said, all right, thank you. I just appreciate it because I 
                                                      
2 The mandate is for 60 months or until the refugee (family) reaches durable self-sufficiency, defined as a household income at or 
above 450% of the Federal Poverty Line, a level called durable self-sufficiency. Importantly, this measure is tied solely to income 
level and no other measure of self-sufficiency. This is the only reference to a definition of self-sufficiency in Massachusetts 
refugee resettlement materials. 
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came here and I didn't even have nothing. I appreciate it for what they did to me. 
And then the people they were saying they're supposed to give you money each 
and every month. And I said the best thing is what they did to take me from where 
I was, where life was bad for me and bring it over here... 
 
Most refugees, however, did not have as easy of a time integrating, and found themselves 
in need of support well beyond the mandate of the resettlement agencies. Several reported 
confusion or dissatisfaction when the service stopped, in some cases abruptly. 
Because that's my caseworker. He, I don't know. He stopped not working. Not 
only that, people when we came here, because when we were in camp they told us 
a lot of things that when you go there they can give you money to welcome in the 
America. But when we came here, we didn't receive any amount of money…. 
 
While Jean-Claude’s response may appear to mean that he received no money 
whatsoever, he later clarified by explaining that the funds were insufficient to meet his needs. 
This was a common response among the refugees I interviewed. In particular, high rent, even 
when halved by placing two refugees to a bedroom, drained the checks they received and made 
survival difficult. Even the transition from cash assistance to wages from employment represents 
a challenge for some refugees, and blame is assigned to the resettlement agencies. Petier was 
resettled by International Institute of New England (IINE), which is commonly referred to by its 
former initials “IIB” (for International Institute of Boston). He scoffed at the first job he was 
offered by IIB. “IIB—the job they are giving people, they cannot sustain me,” he said. He noted 
his expenses, both in the US, paying for the three-bedroom apartment he shared with five other 
refugees, and at home, paying for the education of his four daughters. “11 dollars? I cannot! My 
first job in America, Eric got me that job. $13.50.” Later in the interview, he became even more 
critical of “IIB”: 
If there is some organization, they hold their people like this (crosses arms across 
chest). But IIB when you are here, they just (flings open arms). Fight on your 
own. Yes, I can fight on my own. What they offer you is worthless job. They 
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should consider first intellectual capacity of someone. Me, I am learned. I am not 
a bogus. You cannot give me any any any job. I have no language barrier. 
 
Petier articulates underemployment of refugees, which is a common struggle for former 
white-collar professionals whose qualifications are meaningless in the receiving country. Several 
refugees noted that the money they brought in was insufficient to cover expenses, blaming the 
resettlement agency for directing them to low-paying jobs. In reality, though, due to the 
pressures of the global economy, there are likely few jobs available for refugees in the Boston 
area that pay better. 
Alice was particularly critical of her resettlement agency, Catholic Charities. “And then I 
came here, and Catholic Charities welcomed us. Not good. It was not good.” She shook her head 
vigorously, closing her eyes slightly. She recounted her time in a hotel as she waited for her 
house to be available. She was brought American foods for which she had no appetite, while 
being offered no money whatsoever. “They left us for two months—one month, or even two 
months—without even one dollar to wash clothes.” The tone that carried her French transformed 
from bemused wonder to outrage as she described the next challenge: the house to which she was 
brought. 
After leaving there for Lynn, we were put ten to an apartment. Only one toilet. 
Just like when I came here. We were nine people. But there was only one toilet. 
Only one toilet! 
 
As she described the problems her elderly, incontinent roommate created for the other 
inhabitants of the house, it became clear that her resentment stemmed from an inability to keep 
the space hygienic and safe. A fellow refugee who lived in the home would clean urine off the 
floor and wash her clothes. “She’s like my mother,” he said, according to Patricia. 
The economic solution devised by resettlement agencies—to pair refugees two to a room 
in order to lower the per capita cost of soaring rent prices—has created a number of conflicts for 
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the refugees. Viviane explained to me that an increasing amount of her time is being spent 
resolving issues between roommates. “It really is unfortunate. We are seeing a lot of fighting 
between roommates.” In some cases, disagreements escalate to violence. “The roommate, we had 
two roommates who—one came up with a knife. And I was surprised it was considered as 
domestic violence.” 
When I interviewed him, Petier had taken to sleeping in the living room of his tiny, two-
bedroom apartment. He shared the space with three Eritrean refugees, who speak a different 
language and, according to Petier, have irreconcilably different customs. 
You know, mixing people, mixing people with other people and that… other 
people they came, you know? You cannot mix someone who came from the city 
center and someone who came from the village. It can’t be. It’s like oil and water. 
You get my point? Yes. People are dirty, man. Noisy! Because they don’t know 
but it’s not their fault because where they brought up back home in the village. 
But somebody brought in the city center, he gets it. He’s civilized upstairs. You 
see? I say no, the guy is sleeping let me not make noise. Let me be like this. But a 
villager? You make noise because low level of education also matters. But just 
persevering, let me work hard to save something to get my own house. Eh, see the 
challenges? 
 
Throughout the post-resettlement process, the practices of resettlement agencies create 
stresses that are passed down the line to refugees and post-resettlement RCOs. The practice of 
resettling individual cases and housing those refugees together may increase the likelihood of 
economic success for refugee populations by decreasing their expenses. But the low wages 
earned in the jobs that agencies are able to secure for refugees make life difficult to sustain. 
While these refugees may count in reports as self-sufficient, the CDC has to provide material 
assistance for the basic rights of food or the technology necessary to keep in contact with family. 
The refugees have to provide unpaid labor—like cleaning up after incontinent housemates—to 
ensure that they can remain healthy and safe. The different treatments of mandates by 
resettlement and post-resettlement agencies speaks to divergent focuses. The resettlement 
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agency, focused on the level of the individual, establishes organizational priorities for new 
refugees to ensure that their performance can justify new cases. The post-resettlement agency, 
focused on the level of the community, extends both the timeline and the scope of the mandate to 
include services not dictated by the state, provided over a longer time horizon. 
Resettlement agencies are tasked with the impossible: given minimal funding to resettle 
refugees in a high-cost area, they are expected to create a productive workforce in a period of 
time that is too short with a population that is unlikely to succeed. The state puts unrealistic 
expectations on agencies to effect its employment objectives using a deeply flawed institutional 
and policy architecture. The agencies have made predictable adaptations to increase their 
chances of success. For the most privileged refugees, this system works well. Claude, a 
Congolese male in his twenties who speaks good English and has the capacity and stamina to 
advance in his full-time job, was able to leverage the system and achieve a relatively comfortable 
life in a matter of months. 
But Black feminist thought reminds us that just as multiple coinciding axes of privilege 
foreshadow success, the structural disadvantages of society disproportionately impact those who 
occupy and embody identities of oppression. Kimberlé Crenshaw’s articulation of 
intersectionality affirms that the combination of identities each individual simultaneously 
possesses, signifying varying levels of systemic privilege or oppression, cannot be separated 
from other aspects of the self. Each layer of identity is imbricated upon others to determine a 
person’s ability to access privilege or leverage structures (Crenshaw 1991). Alice, for example, is 
a septuagenarian Congolese woman who speaks no English. Her various disabilities limit her 
mobility in Lynn, which is an inaccessible city. She feels the effects of resettlement agency 
policy acutely because the system is not designed to benefit women, non-English speakers, the 
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elderly, and persons with disabilities, all of which she embodies simultaneously in every 
interaction with state and resettlement officials. From the perspective of the state, such persons 
are more likely to be a “public charge.” As a result, Claude is hailed as a success story, while 
Alice’s humanity is continually contested, if not outright denied, by a structure that renders her 
invisible and extraneous. 
The answer to the question that initiated this line of inquiry is clear: refugees like Placide 
would have a much more difficult time surviving without the CDC performing the un(der)paid, 
unheralded, and often unrecognized labor of correcting the deleterious consequences of 
resettlement policy. Yet there are a number of effects that have not been addressed. This leads to 
the second question: how would the CDC survive without refugees like Placide? 
 
“I walk by myself”: Isolation and Community Fragmentation 
Nearly every time I visited Alice, she would, at some point, pull out her phone, 
open WhatsApp, and scroll through pictures of her daughter, her son, her 
grandchildren. “It was this one’s birthday,” she would say, or, “This one is named 
Alice after me.” A wistful smile would spread across her face. I am very fond of Alice. 
She had a charming, sparkling humor that matched the twinkle in her eye, a joviality 
that lightened our interactions. Her emotions lived just beneath the surface of her 
expressive face. 
The isolation Alice has experienced in the US has been intense. After her 
resettlement agency closed her case to prioritize new arrivals, she was left with 
minimal human contact for weeks. The arthritis that limited her movement and the 
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diabetes that affected her health worsened, and her situation became increasingly 
dire. 
I stayed at my house from the 1st until the 30th without speaking to 
anyone like this. I was alone in bed. If I got up, I sat down over there. I 
bathed, I rested, if I had to cook I would cook, if I didn’t cook I would 
rest, always in my bedroom like this. From the 1st to the 30th I didn’t 
even go outside. If I went outside, I would walk a little like this by myself. 
I would always return here because when you don’t know the language, 
where will you go? If I go like that, I will come back quickly. Back home I 
would walk a bit and it would cause me a bit of pain, but nothing like 
now. Not even with a cane. I walk by myself like that. I walk by myself. 
 
She told me her head had begun to bother her when she arrived—she thought 
too much of home. Before she was diagnosed with a benign brain tumor, she 
attributed the head pain to the stress of separation from her loved ones. 
Unsurprisingly, after spending a month mostly alone with her health deteriorating, she 
ended up in the hospital. After a brief stay, her doctors assigned a team to monitor 
her; they deemed her suicidal. 
She sighed. “Moi, je suis comme prisonnier,” she said: I am like a prisoner.  
I stayed alone. Every month—one month, two months, three months—
alone! No. And when I went to the hospital, Betty [the home health aide] 
started to come, and Viviane, too. And the nurse, and the doctor who 
came here. At night, the woman who worked here started just to talk 
with me. And so it went like that. My head started to hurt and lost 
function little by little. It was hurting me each and every day. But who 
could I tell? Who am I going to tell? I was alone. I was alone. 
  
Now, I met Betty. It’s Betty who was the first one to come here and then, 
and then the other one who followed her. They stayed here together. 
We started to chat, we started to talk, until she brought an interpreter—
she speaks in English, and me, I speak in Lingala. With the interpreter it 
has been good, up to now. 
 
She paused. Her eyes began to water before she broke down into sobs. 
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Mais j’ai besoin de mes enfants. I need my children. (Cries) Because I’m 
always alone! I am always alone. Like [the volunteer], she comes twice 
a week. I am always alone. If you want to see Viviane, you call her. If 
you don’t call, she is over there. I have sent for her. Stay in there 
herself. Viviane works. If she doesn’t have work, I am always alone. 
_______ 
As can likely be expected from a system that resettles mostly individuals and fractures 
traditional kinship units that organize human life, the experience of isolation for Congolese 
refugees in the North Shore is widespread.  
Participants provide a number of factors that contribute to their feelings of isolation and 
loneliness. First, the need to work long hours to meet the cost of living in the North Shore creates 
a culture of “busyness” that stymies the development of social bonds and community formation. 
The inability to organize socially is particularly damaging for those separated from their families. 
Second, inadequate language learning programming both prevents refugees from connecting 
with those who do not speak Congolese languages and makes independence and autonomy 
difficult. Both of these factors will be unpacked in further detail. 
 
The Business of Busyness 
Gilbert scheduled our interview in the two hour break between his full-time 
jobs. He arrived in a bomber jacket, a Chicago Bulls fitted cap, and clean sneakers. 
His English was excellent; he credited his education to both the time he spent in 
Zimbabwe (and the woman he married there) and his consumption of American 
music. 50 Cent, he reported, had long been his favorite rapper. 
Gilbert cast a leonine gaze, resolute and unflinching, that matched his strong 
presence. He reflected on his past with a frankness bordering on rehearsed 
emotionlessness, procedurally describing the escape from his home, where his 
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mother was being raped and his father was staring down the barrel of a pistol. He 
found an opportunity to slip through the door and he ran. He kept running when he 
heard two gunshots. He didn’t dare turn around to look. 
“I think way too much,” he said. “That’s why I’ve got two full-time jobs.” 
For Gilbert, overemployment is not just an emotional coping mechanism—it is 
the only way to achieve his desire to buy a trip back to Africa once he gets his green 
card.  
I have to work so hard to get the money. Then I have to know what 
exactly is my departing time where my parents are. Are they still alive? 
Yes or no? If I find out, that's OK. Without that, I'll never have peace. 
See if they've already passed away. I will see. I'll see their grave and 
that's my life. I have to work hard and get my paper and try to make a 
visit one day to see if they're still alive or not. 
 
His steely composure ruptured as he dissolved into deep sobs. He lifted 
a hand to cover his face. The cries erupted from his chest.  
It has been Gilbert’s dream to come to the US since he was a child. Initially 
dissatisfied with his new life in Boston, he crafted a different ambition: he decided to 
chase his  American dream. “[B]y the time I came over here,” he said, “I realized that 
the American dream is to make people pay your bills. If you make some people pay 
your bills, that's the American dream. If you're paying your bills by yourself, that is not 
the American dream. You're kidding yourself.” 
He sleeps four hours a day, he said, or maybe five on a good day. But he is 
determined to achieve a life of comfort and wealth. 
I have to live the way I want. Not like, not like living the life like it doesn't 
work. I'm working. I'm going to spend money. I don't spend my money. I 
saved my money. I don't go out. I don't even have a friend in Boston. My 
friend is my job. … I always say that I live with our family no more so—
so it's God first. Money is second. Yeah. God. Money. That's it. 
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_________ 
Gilbert’s assertion that he has no friends in Boston is framed as a product of his intense 
work schedule. A number of refugees attribute their lack of social bonds to the need to work. 
Forced to work long hours to meet basic needs, refugees experience strain that is transferred to 
their social and communal livelihoods. Frederic explicitly connected community isolation to a 
capitalist mode of production: 
We're so busy. This is killing us. We have to work. We have to find two jobs. 
Yes. I understand that these people have two jobs, that people that have three 
jobs, but they know the notion of the family. They know the notion of to have a 
community is better, but you cannot force them….[W]e all hide behind the 
American system: capitalism. 
 
As noted in Chapter One, the division of labor leads not only to the fragmentation of a 
workforce, but a fracturing of society. The adage that time is money acquires new salience for 
low-wage earning refugees with high expenses; respondents report pressure to devote a larger 
share of their time to productive labor and less to developing social bonds. As hours are 
exchanged for capital, the time spent on social interaction vanishes.  
Pierre Jalée explains that the laborer in a capitalist system, separated from the means of 
subsistence necessary for survival, commodifies her time for sale in a market in order to afford 
that which is necessary to live (Jalée 1977: 22-24). In a high cost of living context like the North 
Shore suburbs of Boston, the refugee faces one of two options. The first—seek high-wage 
employment and devote a relatively small number of hours to labor—is an impossibility in the 
short-term for all refugees. Even the highest-skilled of entrants have qualifications that are not 
recognized by the hostland society. This option is perhaps accessible in the medium/long run 
only to the most privileged refugees, whose combination of productive capacity, linguistic 
competence, and personal sacrifice enable them to eventually climb an unlikely ladder and reach 
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self-advancement. This is the goal of Gilbert. The second, more likely option available to 
refugees is to seek low-wage labor and commodify an even larger portion of time to additional 
employment by taking on another job. Working “two jobs” is central to the responses of both 
Gilbert and Frederic. The ability to seek a second job also represents a form of privilege, 
allocated along divisions of gender.  
Marthe, a working mother of six children, was under the impression that there were not 
many Congolese in the community: 
They are there, but they are not many. 
Q: Do you spend time with other people in the community? 
Only in the school, but to walk around—I don’t have time because I work. 
 
It should be expected that women describe themselves as having little free time. Due to a 
division of household labor at the family level and cultural gender norms, women are expected to 
provide the additional unpaid labor associated with child-rearing. Hochschild and Machung 
(1989) introduced the term “second shift” to account for the housework, childcare, and familial 
labor expected of working mothers upon returning home from their job. Among first generation 
immigrants, research suggests that gender inequities in terms of household labor remains higher 
than native populations and later generations of migrants (Hwang 2016). Women’s time, sold as 
labor, is valued less when sold on the open market. They also have less time to sell, as household 
and familial duties disproportionately fall to the immigrant woman. Thus, though time is money, 
women are less able to convert their time into productive capital, but remain “busy.” 
 Busyness is a key to refugee survival. As used by refugees, it represents a coded response 
that encapsulates the need to commodify labor, exploitation by gendered economic systems, 
aspirations for a better life, and the subordination of social priorities for the sake of economic 
advancement. Social and communal bonds are sacrificed at the altar of the wage economy.  
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The result of busyness is social isolation. By social isolation, I mean the condition and 
experience that results from being apart from a social unit. The clearest evidence of isolation is 
the variation in responses regarding the size of the community. Isolated refugees, like Marthe 
above, were under the impression that there were very few Congolese peoples live in the region. 
Jean-Claude echoed this sentiment, while suggesting that the community was less active than the 
one he experienced in refugee camps. 
I don't know a lot of Congolese here in Lynn. No. Yeah, I know only the friend 
here who was my friend in school here. Yeah. I don't know anything I—like 
because when I was in Zambia and camp, that was making like a community, a 
group like boys like you, like when you find a program we can help you and me. I 
couldn't have a program. You could have been like that, but here in Lynn I didn't 
see that. 
 
The refugee community in the camp is linked with access to opportunity structures. In 
Lynn, the ability to share knowledge of opportunities with a community is foreclosed because 
Jean-Claude does not know enough Congolese people to create a similar community. 
The most extreme response regarding the size of the community came from Patricia. A 
translator relayed her message: “Because the only Congolese here are like Eric and her wife, no 
one else. Because like whatever her problems, she goes to Eric, Eric with her problems and he 
helps her.” I was quite surprised, having met scores—if not hundreds—of Congolese immigrants 
during my time in Lynn.  She pointed to the upstairs of her home.  
“There’s others up there,” the translator said. Earlier, she had mentioned the group of 
single men who lived on the upper level of her small duplex. She never went up there though as a 
single woman—mingling with unmarried men was not something to do in her culture, she 
explained. “The only Congolese people she knows here they’re solely above. There not a lot of 
them.” 
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How is it that some people can integrate into a Congolese community in Lynn while 
others do not even know it exists? I asked Frederic about whether the Congolese community is 
strong for newcomers. 
I would like that, but strong, strong. I can be honest with, you. No. I can be honest 
with you. Now when I say that, it’s because I see because population that I see in 
CDC, I don't see them in the community. That I know they are not. And then 
that's hurtful because for me, when they say that the Congolese community, that 
means anybody who came with that label of Congolese, he has to be known or yes 
and no the community, but people that I see in CDC, some of them are focused 
that—they don't know if there's a community here. They don't know these people, 
they don't know that they can go to people to talk to…. 
 
When you look in the CDC, the charts there, you can see that there are a lot who 
are refugee, Congolese, but when I go now to the church or when I go to the 
community who used to, who has been here for a long time, but I don't see the 
new-coming in those areas. The new-coming who have been known are the ones 
who have been come. They say that they didn't come as a refugee. They come as 
an asylum or they come for school or this kind of stuff. Those are the more norms, 
but when you see kind of like a refugee, they still be in their corner. That's why 
I'm saying that. 
 
According to Frederic, being a client of the CDC makes it likely that a refugee will not be 
a part of the community. Frederic appears to articulate a difference between refugees and the 
ones who “have been come”—the established community of migrants that arrived decades ago. 
By stating that there are differences between refugees and asylum seekers, it appears that 
Frederic’s analysis of the established community presents a division that keeps the “new-
coming” refugees separate. Unfortunately, because I limited my interview population to 
refugees, my data fails to answer the question of why refugees are not integrated into the 
established Congolese community. 
 The evidence suggests quite clearly, though, that the CDC has not successfully advocated 
for the integration of refugees into a broader community. Whether or not there have been efforts 
to connect refugees to the community is not particularly clear. The second item of the 
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organization’s mission statement would suggest that the development of a Congolese 
community, presumably comprising both newly arrived refugees and established Congolese 
immigrants, is central to the organization’s practice: “Strengthen the Congolese community by 
promoting mutual assistance, increasing their capacity to serve their local communities” 
(Congolese Development Center 2018). Yet the responses of participants suggests not only that 
such a community does not serve the needs of refugees, but there are questions as to whether a 
coherent community of Congolese immigrants even exists. Jean-Claude described to me a 
feeling of helplessness and confusion in seeking direction. 
Where can I go? Where I can have a problem, I run this way, I can go somewhere 
and go like this to help. It’s not like money, to be money. No. Just advice. No 
someone giving me advice. No. Maybe do like this, like this. It'd be like this. So 
that's why I want to help from some, from you advise me how I can take care of 
my family. I can take care of myself and—and all of my things. I am all alone if 
no one but myself here. No family. I have no one like this. 
 
More than a request for assistance, Jean-Claude suggests that the inability to solve his 
problems stems from a lack of co-present family. He expresses not only a desire to solve his 
problems, but also a need to no longer be alone. By evoking the image of a Congolese family, he 
hearkens an expansive and central social unit that is key to Congolese life. African scholars like 
Kayongo-Male and Onyango (1984) note that extended kinship is central to the African family. 
Participants in my research reiterated this point, connecting it with the specific example of the 
Congo. Alice said: 
But us, we are Africans. With Africans, it’s always a family matter. If you are in 
the family, you marry. The wife takes care of the whole family. If you have a 
father, mother, you wife stays with your parents and takes care of your mother, 
father, and brothers. You eat together. You see? …In Africa, it’s the family. It’s 
the aunts, the uncles, mothers, fathers, grandfather, grandmother—all are family. 
 
The link between a large, extended family and an assertion of African identity reveals 
why the fragmentation of the family in individual resettlement can be so pernicious, and why 
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experiences of isolation can be so acute. The sense of familial duty—of taking care of kin—
creates a social function for this kinship unit, linking Alice’s expression of isolation with Jean-
Claude’s desire for a social network to help address his problems. The concept of Congolese 
family is echoed by Frederic. 
[Y]ou have to understand in African culture, it's not only you, your wife and your 
kid or you and your mother. Now you have cousins, you have an uncle, you have 
a—all these, these people. That's African culture. When they said in the family, 
that's your family because it's not only the one who you sent here with them, but 
all these people you know. 
 
 The wide family structure from which Congolese refugees are alienated creates a need for 
community and social belonging. This social need is not currently being met, as respondents 
describe feeling alone and detached from a Congolese community. Even though the needs 
typically fulfilled by an immigrant social network are being met, the opportunity to seek 
assistance or social fulfillment from a community of Congolese immigrants does not fully exist. 
 
Language and Isolation 
In the story that opens this section, Alice notes that her physical mobility is limited by the 
inability to speak English. She asks, “[W]hen you don’t know the language, where will you go?” 
Her words speak to a larger question—perhaps an existential one—of the ability to discern 
direction and seek guidance in the absence of linguistic competence. Lacking fluency in the 
language of the hostland nation, the refugee experiences a smaller universe of individuals 
available to offer assistance who speak their same language. Clement recalls the initial difficulty 
of communicating before he became comfortable speaking some English: 
The difficulty of language is for someone to understand you. You have to try to 
find someone who can communicate in the same language as you, and then it 
becomes easy. But I don’t always know beforehand. There are things I am 
looking for, but because when you don’t know the language it becomes difficult. 
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 According to Clément’s response, communication as a temporal exchange occasionally 
extends well beyond verbal articulation. There is a need to prepare for interactions by searching 
for translators and activating social networks for any task requiring communication. For Clement 
and many refugees, the CDC fills this need. Through translation, the institution’s resources can 
connect refugees to resources. 
But language plays a more important role than simply connecting refugees to resources. 
Researchers have demonstrated that communities which lack sufficient language support 
experience social isolation (Allen 2007). Studies of Sudanese refugee women suggest that the 
language instruction offered to refugees does not equip them to engage their surroundings or 
environment (Warriner 2007). The combined effect of these two findings compound in the North 
Shore, where language instruction consists of English for Employment (EFE) rather than full 
English as a Second Language (ESL) programming. English, the dominant language, is 
presented as a productive force of human capital rather than a necessary component of human 
life.  
Challenging the dominant conception of language as a tool primarily useful for economic 
integration, a team of researchers led by Stephanie Nawyn found that the primary concern for 
many refugees were factors like an inability to access information, the exacerbation of social 
isolation, and anxiety about navigating structures and formal procedures without being able to 
adequately understand them (Nawyn et al 2012). The refugees in Nawyn’s study lacked access to 
an ethnic community-based post-resettlement organization like the CDC, so the solution to these 
challenges was often to locate bilingual co-nationals, who themselves lacked resources, to assist 
with translation as problems arose. 
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While the Congolese refugees in Lynn expressed difficulties with English in terms of 
access to employment, the economic concerns were secondary to social and procedural concerns. 
Patricia, speaking through an interpreter, believes that her inability to speak English may limit 
her ability to make friends. 
Maybe it’s because she doesn’t speak English. Because like even if she tried to 
make friends, they wouldn’t be speaking the same language so it would be hard. 
You wouldn’t be understanding each other.  
 
Patricia suggests that her network of social contacts is decreased because the number of 
people with whom she can communicate is relatively small. Through the translation services it 
provides, the CDC offers an avenue for knowledge sharing and navigating many of the complex 
procedures that are central to refugee life, including family reunification, public benefit 
assistance, and vital documents received through the mail. In describing the linguistic and 
procedural assistance the CDC offers, the emphasis was placed on paper and documentary forms. 
I will use the term “documentary civic society” to describe the use of paper and documents to 
mete out privileges and benefits from the state. Paper became a symbol that represents potential 
access and encapsulated the anxiety of a powerful, unforgiving state. In some ways, the 
documentary procedures that characterize American life, transmitted through paper documents, 
create dependency on the CDC. The CDC decodes the document, describes the procedure, and 
directs action. Consider this statement from Alice: 
If I have something, I call her [Viviane]. If there are letters, I call her, “Come here 
to read this. What does it say?” If she comes to see, she says it says this, this, and 
that. 
 
Alice clearly understands that letters often require prompt action, particularly for refugees 
who receive government communications through the mail. It is the role of the CDC to 
demystify the processes that are contained within the various papers and render them legible for 
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clients. Placide, the elderly refugee who was denied SSI benefits, would come to the CDC office 
nearly every day with a stack of envelopes to be reviewed by Papa Eric. He grew very upset on 
several occasions when a roommate took his mail from the mailbox and never passed it along to 
its intended recipient. 
In addition to maintaining the power to decode papers and documents, the CDC also has 
the expertise to initiate complex procedures centered around paper. For processes like family 
reunification, in particular, the paperwork is incredibly complex and specific. Procedures must 
be carefully followed. Gilbert mentioned the centrality of the CDC in his attempts to reconnect 
with his wife. “I found Papa Eric, who is the one who helped me to do all the paperwork,” he 
said. “He always—all of it's done for me.” By doing the work for Gilbert, Eric exercises his 
expertise to accomplish the goal of family reunification without sharing knowledge of the 
process with him. 
Paper, as the vessel for official state communications, assumes an authority that refugees 
recognize, but that some cannot discern. By positioning itself as the central point of contact for 
both translation and the technical expertise to direct clients, the CDC fills a critical need of the 
community, created, in part, by the decision of resettlement agencies to teach language through 
EFE programming. The centralized model of service provision leads the CDC to accumulate 
technical expertise, leading to two effects. First, this division of labor allows for specialization 
and the refinement of expertise. The CDC, in short, becomes better at its job. Second, the 
community becomes dependent on the institution. If technical knowledge and translation services 
were distributed throughout the community—meaning if the institution did not position itself as 
the sole point of reference for the decoding of documentary civic life—then the community 
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could draw upon and develop its own resources, skills, and knowledges to address its problems 
outside of the CDC.  
Such an approach would mean shifting (or redistributing) the burden to the community, 
which presents new problems. The community would not be compensated for this additional 
labor, while the CDC receives public and private funding dedicated to these purposes. 
Additionally, it is not clear whether the community is capable of successfully providing advice 
and services for a complex regime of paperwork. Nevertheless, engaging the extant community 
more would serve an important social function: connecting refugees with one another, and 
achieving a Congolese refugee community—a group of people connected through a common 
bond. Perhaps language offers the opportunity to develop a network of bilingual co-nationals that 
create links between newly arrived refugees and the larger community. 
 But the necessity of learning the dominant language proves both the centrality of 
language to the national project, and the failure of thinking about refugee resettlement in terms of 
integration. Integration—the valuing of both minority and majority cultures in a coexistent, 
multi-ethnic society—would require work on the part of the dominant culture to create a society 
that values and incorporates minority languages and makes it possible to survive without 
linguistic intermediaries. That is not the world respondents describe, or that I experienced as a 
researcher. The reality is a society that makes half-hearted attempts at minority language 
acknowledgment. The clearest examples are signs at hospitals with instructions written in dozens 
of languages that direct non-English speakers to access translation. But the refugees and the 
hospital staff reported frustration with the translation network, which often led to a search for 
alternatives (including co-present translators) or, more troublingly, a decrease in the amount of 
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information communicated to non-English speakers. Recognizing that the conditions for 
integration do not exist, refugees instead report a desire for linguistic assimilation.  
 For Black peoples in white-dominant societies, language is exercised as a nationalistic 
tool that erases history and experiences of oppression. In articulating his disdain for America, 
Frederic links the English language to the national project of colonialism and imperialism. 
“Myself, I never liked English because it was like, I had a conception as a student: they're the 
one who is making so many nations unpeaceful.” When he was young, Frederic’s teacher would 
ask him questions in English. He would respond in French. 
Frederic’s rejection of English stems from its association with the (neo)colonial legacies 
of violence and oppression of English-speaking states. His response evokes Jamaica Kincaid’s 
writing on language and its association with national consciousness. She captures the violence of 
Western language as a homogenizing tool, particularly when imposed as a standard for Black 
peoples. 
For isn’t it odd that the only language I have in which to speak of this crime is the 
language of the criminal who committed the crime? And what can that really 
mean? For the language of the criminal can contain only the goodness of the 
criminal’s deed. The language of the criminal can explain and express the deed 
only from the criminal’s point of view. It cannot contain the horror of the deed, 
the injustice of the deed, the agony, the humiliation inflicted on me. (Kincaid 
1997: 32) 
  
Frantz Fanon similarly linked the use of language to the personal experience of 
nationalism, equating the deployment of linguistic knowledge to an endorsement of the cultural 
values of a civilization “To speak means to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the 
morphology of this or that language, but it means above all to assume a culture, to support the 
weight of a civilization” (Fanon [1952] 2008: 8).  
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The expectation of linguistic assimilation imposed upon Congolese refugees expands 
upon an American history on the use of language to assign alterity to Black peoples. Michelle M. 
Wright, writing on the American creation of Black identity, asserts that the use of language was 
central in the creation of a nation from abstract ideas. She positions logos and language at the 
center of the composition of the American nation, and restricts citizenship only to those who 
have access to it. 
Logos, therefore, directed and represented the reality of the American nation, 
further suggesting that only those who had access to this logos—those who were 
literate—could direct and represent the nation. Although the literacy level among 
the white population was low, the idea of a literate Negro was itself fantastical, as 
only the former were associated with the spoken and written language, and it was 
language that composed the nation. (emphasis in original, Wright 2004: 55) 
 
Wright goes on to note that Thomas Jefferson, the wealthy plantation owner turned 
president who espoused some of the most foundational theories of American racism, frames the 
Negro as a non-literate, inferior corporeal entity that could not transcend the limits of his own 
flesh to achieve the rationality necessary for language, logos, or, consequently, membership in 
the American nation. 
In (re)producing Blackness as a physical aberration and whiteness as a coloring 
that signifies an ability to transform words into deeds, Jefferson hoped to sidestep 
a point made over and over again by antislavery factions: the fact that the Negro 
possesses all the characteristics ascribed to humans and therefore could be 
confused with no other species. Jefferson allows for the Negro’s humanity in the 
vaguest sense but would never allow for his ability to become an American. 
Although he failed to convince others of the need for wholesale expatriation of 
Negroes, Jefferson was able to print indelibly on the white American mind this 
idea of the Negro as antithetical to the American nation. (Wright 2005: 64) 
 
Language is central to the nation-building project in part because it is central in defining 
race, creating a subclass of persons whose oppression is justified and whose exclusion from 
American society is incontestable. Within the Congolese community, language operates as a tool 
that inherently positions the Black subject as the Other in the American system. It justifies the 
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exploitation and oppression of those who are excluded from, or are defined as antithetical to, the 
American nation. Documentary civic society and the paper on which it is printed serve as vessels 
that encapsulate the interwoven dynamics between language, alterity, race, and the nation-state. 
It is a major nexus of state power that is wielded against refugees, serving as barriers to basic 
needs from benefits to families and requiring intermediaries to decode. 
African culture, in both kinship and linguistic practices, locates the Congolese refugee as 
a racialized other. The barriers erected to safeguard the public benefits of white societies and 
limit access replicate fears, internalized beneath the level of consciousness, of Black individuals 
consuming supposedly scarce resources, changing white culture, eroding white privilege, and 
fundamentally transforming society. The American resettlement project shows that integration 
into American society—the coexistence of multiple cultures—is impossible for Black refugees 
from the Congo. The state is designed to instead promote assimilation, the incorporation of 
refugees into a racialized subclass of humans for whom oppression and marginalization are 
justified, normalized, and expected. 
 
Conclusion 
The conditions and practices of refugee resettlement in the North Shore lead to a hyper-
fractured Congolese community, positioning the CDC as a gatekeeper to institutional knowledge 
after the resettlement period. In its “civil societal” role of mediating the relationship between the 
individual refugees and the state, the CDC delivers cultural competence that refugees appreciate 
and prefer to the services provided by resettlement agencies. They cooperate with the state in 
connecting refugees to state services, while deviating beyond the explicit mandate of the state 
when the conventions of culture deem this most appropriate.  
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The ability to navigate, translate, and decode power through the symbol of paper, coupled 
with the lack of kinship- and community-based Gemeinschaft alternatives, centers the CDC in 
post-resettlement service provision. Just as refugees depend on the CDC to navigate the complex 
procedures that define their experience of American life, the CDC depends on a refugee 
community with consistent and steady needs for institutional survival. A cynic might suggest that 
the CDC, having a vested interest in a dependent community, intentionally separates refugees 
from the community and hoards expertise to maintain relevance. But I view the failures of the 
CDC as a subordination of the important to the urgent. Overburdened employees, responding to 
constant crises, lack the capacity to critically evaluate practices. Time constraints do not allow 
the institution to evaluate organizational behavior in these terms. But the result of the structures 
of global capitalism, hegemonic state power, and white supremacist ideology that both scaffold 
and permeate refugee resettlement and post-resettlement, combined with the choices of the 
agents who operate within them, lead to conditions that create a culture of mutual dependency 
between the refugees and post-resettlement agencies. 
Each party to the organization—the refugees and the community organizations that exist 
to serve their needs—exploits the other as a social resource to survive. But the exploitation does 
not operate in the same way. For refugees, the exploitation comes as way of attaining 
fundamental human rights: money to pay for rent, the opportunity to be with one’s family, the 
security of healthcare, among many others. The CDC exploits refugees to ensure institutional 
survival. Ultimately, this reality safeguards resources that the refugee community desperately 
needs. At this current moment, the many benefits the CDC provides likely justify the exploitation 
necessary for its existence. Yet a question emerges: is the full provision of human rights 
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compatible with the coexistence of the CDC? Would the institution survive without a dependent 
clientele that required its services?  
Simply because the CDC offers net positive services does not mean it should be spared 
such critical questioning. So long as there are people in need, the CDC will continue to offer a 
venue for assisting the refugees. But that does not mean that more sustainable, empowering 
alternatives should not be imagined. When Eric entered my office with Placide’s SSI rejection 
papers in hand, he held in his hands the key to survival for both Placide and the CDC. He held 
evidence of systemic racism and exploitation that both creates refugees and enacts barriers to 
prevent them from thriving. He held access to state power that could be selectively allocated to 
refugees. He held the privilege of institutional security, and separation from the crises that justify 
the existence of the CDC. 
“What would he do without us?”  
When the CDC asked me this question of Placide, the Placides asked me this question of 
the CDC. 
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Conclusion 
   
 
 
 
 
111 
Refugee resettlement in the United States is a flawed system that exerts excessive 
pressure on all aspects of the resettlement regime. The demands of the conditional funding 
apparatus established by the government force resettlement agencies to compete for refugees, 
leading them to change both the populations they resettle and the ways resources are allocated to 
clients. The preference for single male cases, the most employable clientele of resettlement 
agencies, is reflected in the cases designated for resettlement in the North Shore and is 
internalized by refugees in the pre-resettlement process. Those refugees who report having no 
family to be resettled along with them are sent to refugee-receiving countries without kinship 
networks. Husbands and fathers who misrepresent their familial relations in an attempt to appear 
“single” are separated from their families. They face the added stress of supporting wives and 
children while struggling with separation from them. 
Additionally, the imperative placed on employment leads resettlement agencies, facing 
the strains of limited funding and scarce resources, to devote their efforts to maximizing the 
employability of their clients. While this approach supports the hazy economic goal of self-
sufficiency, defined at the level of implementation by street-level practitioners, it comes at the 
cost of developing certain cultural competencies that are necessary for full social integration. 
Many of the failures that result from the decisions of and the pressures placed upon resettlement 
agencies are passed along to post-resettlement organizations like the Congolese Development 
Center (CDC). The CDC offers culturally appropriate and, according to participants, superior 
service provision that is desperately needed by the community. While the CDC provides vital 
functions for the community by serving as a centralized point of access for post-resettlement 
resources, the organization does not address the social isolation and loneliness that respondents 
identify as central to their experience of life in the US. 
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It is undeniable that Congolese refugees experience subjugation and oppression resulting 
from their location in society. The community is not to be blamed for the difficulties they face, 
nor are they expected to be solely responsible for the amelioration of these oppressions. 
Deviating from the intellectual tradition of blaming marginalized individuals and communities 
for the oppressions they experience, my research locates inequality not in the failures of 
refugees, resettlement agencies, or post-resettlement organizations, but in the overarching 
structures of society. The practice of pathologizing marginalized communities and individuals, 
tied with conceptions of race and gender that are central to an exploitative economy, exacerbates 
the challenges faced by Congolese refugees attempting to integrate into American society. 
Entering US society embodying Blackness subjects Congolese refugees to a position of 
systematic exclusion that limits opportunities and positions the Black body outside of American 
citizenship, exposing the fallacy of integration and revealing assimilation as the central (if 
unspoken) objective of refugee resettlement. The structures that shape the subjugation of 
Congolese refugees are not determinative; they do not presume a monolithic experience of 
oppression and exploitation imposed upon this marginalized population. Rather, the structures of 
society shape spaces of both resistance and compliance that contribute to the specific oppressions 
experienced by the community.  
The CDC, like all RCOs, is positioned in relation to larger structures of economics, 
governance, and society. Focusing solely on the functions these organizations fulfill, as much 
scholarship on RCOs does, ignores the variables that impact the ways RCOs relate to clients, 
respond to pressures, and address structural inequalities. Functionalist analyses have failed to 
adequately account for global and national structures that determine the operations of 
institutions. The underlying presumption of functionalism—that social organizations will emerge 
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to address underlying needs—must be critically examined and perhaps inverted. Soysal asserts 
that “the organizing principles and incorporation styles of the host polity are crucial variables in 
accounting for the emerging organizational patterns of migrants” (Soysal 1994: 85-6). It is both 
the needs of the community and the structures of society that determine what organizations will 
look like, whom they will serve, and, ultimately, how they will function.  
The functions of the CDC have shifted to accommodate massive changes in the 
composition of the Congolese community being resettled into the North Shore. These changes 
are catalyzed by a global economy of neoliberal governance that exerts pressures on refugees and 
the agencies that resettle them. The emphasis of service provision for resettlement agencies has 
been placed on providing material support to encourage economic self-sufficiency. But the 
inability to address many of the needs that refugees face push issues down the service chain to 
post-resettlement agencies. In correcting the problems of resettlement, the CDC is forced to 
choose between addressing what Martha Nussbaum (2003: 39) calls the “first-generation rights” 
of political and civil liberties, or the “second-generation rights” of social and economic rights.  
While it is helpful to think of certain rights as more central to the resettlement project of 
human development than others, the division between generational rights articulated by 
Nussbaum requires tailoring. In particular, separating political rights from economic rights 
ignores the intertwined experience of structural forces that define governance in the neoliberal 
age. The reality, as David Harvey (2005) notes, is that neoliberalism has led to the unification of 
the economic and political spheres. Pierre Bourdieu writes about the conflation of economics and 
politics, and the effect on social agents caught within this consolidation of power: 
[T]he unification of the economic field tends…to hurl all social agents into an 
economic game for which they are not equally prepared and equipped, culturally 
and economically. It tends by the same token to submit them to standards 
objectively imposed by competition from more efficient productive forces and 
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modes of production….In short, unification benefits the dominant. (emphasis in 
original, Bourdieu 2003: 93, cited in Calhoun 2006) 
 
In 1944, Karl Polanyi presciently wrote, “To allow the market mechanism to be sole 
director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment...would result in the 
demolition of society” (Polanyi [1944] 2001: 76). Within refugee resettlement, the market has 
determined not only how the Congolese community organizes and which resources it is able to 
access, but also who gets to be included in the resettled refugee community. The human rights of 
refugees that relate to their ability to define and create a social community have been either 
largely unaccounted for or entirely neglected. The Congolese community, assembled by various 
market mechanisms that privilege the individual over the community and create conditions of 
economic fundamentalism, provides an unfortunately fertile soil to witness, on a small scale, the 
demolition of society that Polanyi predicted. 
The trend of neoliberalism leads to the erosion of national sovereignty through 
multilateral trade agreements, international economic institutions, and the proliferation of 
multinational corporations that exert outsize influence on states (Harvey 2005; Prashad 2008). 
Inequality soars as the economic gains of trade liberalization are concentrated among a 
transnational capitalist class, leading to an experience of economic stagnation for all other 
segments of the population. In the US, as politicians reassert the importance of the nation-state in 
populist nationalism, this economic stagnation is blamed, in part, on vilified migrants, who are 
defined by their cultural unassimilability, their economic incompetence, their voracious 
consumption of public benefits, and their willingness to compete with (and “undercut” by 
accepting less favorable terms than) white workers in the labor market. While such narratives 
ignore evidence of the economic benefit of immigrants, they prey upon, exacerbate, and create 
racial narratives of inferiority that assign alterity to migrants. A supposed competition for scarce 
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economic resources, framed as a battle between native and foreign populations, leads to the 
revival of xenophobic nationalist narratives that re-inscribe membership to the American state 
along increasingly salient ethno-racial lines.  
In the United States, the Trump administration has weaponized the legitimate use of 
physical force granted to the state (Weber [1919] 1965) to police migration by emphasizing law 
and order, expanding deportation, restricting asylum claims, targeting the long-standing policy of 
family reunification, and advocating for the creation of a physical wall along the land border 
between the US and Mexico (Bloemraad and de Graauw 2017). Trump’s policies may curb 
“voluntary” migration to some degree, but they cannot stop the many social processes that lead 
peoples to travel across borders and enter into the United States in ways that are viewed as both 
legal and illegal. Refugees, however, represent a different case entirely. Unlike other pathways 
of migration, the executive branch of the US government, currently led by anti-immigrant 
extremist Donald Trump, can essentially halt all intakes of refugees.  
While the figures have been presented elsewhere in this project, the specific details bear 
repeating. The administration proposed resettling 45,000 refugees for fiscal year (FY) 2018, the 
lowest number since the formal refugee resettlement program began in 1980 (USRAP 2017). 
Based on the first six months of resettlement data for FY 2018, the administration is on track to 
resettle 21,096 refugees for the year—less than half of the record-low projection (Refugee 
Processing Center 2018). Non-white refugees are disproportionately affected by Trump 
administration policies. The Trump administration ensured that the US fell far short of the FY 
2017 ceiling of 110,000 refugees set by the Obama administration, resettling only 53,716 
refugees total (Refugee Processing Center 2017). Table 1 shows that while refugees from non-
white regions fell far short of projected totals set by the Obama administration, white refugees 
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from Europe resettled by the Trump administration actually exceeded the ceiling established by 
Obama (see figure 1). Trump, and other anti-immigrant white nationalists in government, can 
effectuate preferences for white migrants in refugee resettlement precisely because the entire 
domestic resettlement regime is under the purview of the administrative branch, without any 
substantive checks on the authority of the president to determine which or how many refugees 
are resettled. 
 
Region 
FY 2017 Projected 
Ceiling1 
FY 2017 Actual 
Number 
Resettled2 
Difference from 
Projection 
Africa 35,000 20,232 -14,768 
East Asia 12,000 5,173 -6,827 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
5,000 1,688 -3,312 
Near East/South Asia 40,000 21,418 -18,582 
Europe 4,000 5,205 +1,205 
Source: 1 USRAP. (2017). Proposed refugee admissions for fiscal year 2018: Report to the 
Congress. Washington, DC: United States Senate. 
2 Refugee Processing Center. (2018). Refugee arrivals by region as of March 31, 2018 (based 
on nationality of PA). Washington, DC: Department of State. 
Table 1—Comparison between projected ceiling of refugees and actual number of refugees 
resettled for fiscal year 2017. 
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Because resettlement funding is tied directly to the number of refugees resettled, the 
money made available for refugee resettlement declines in proportion to the decrease in refugee 
admissions. By starving the resettlement apparatus of refugees, the Trump administration could 
inflict long-term (if not permanent) damage to the capacity of the United States to resettle 
refugees in the future. Agencies that currently have well-trained, experienced staffs may be 
forced to lay off workers or shut down their operations entirely. If this occurs, even an 
administration that views refugees more favorably could have fewer private sector partners to 
accept cases for resettlement. Ultimately, this means that resettlement and post-resettlement 
agencies may not be able to provide adequate care to the communities they serve in the 
intermediate and long terms. 
Eric Kamba, the Executive Director of the CDC, acknowledged the nature of the current 
policy environment when I asked him about his hopes for the future of his organization. 
I’m just saying that we are trusted in the community, we have experience, and we 
like helping people. That’s what I’m saying is the mission for us. We are wishing 
for good conditions of work so that we can continue to provide services to the 
people we serve to help our community. So I wish that in terms of navigating the 
politics, we are going to have a good immigration policy, maybe 5 years from 
now or 8 years from now that would allow community-based organizations or 
small community-based organizations to be here, to help refugees. 
 
While Eric foregrounds policy concerns, it is obvious that the CDC will not allow an 
unfavorable administration to prevent them from serving the community. With policy and public 
discourse changing so drastically, the future demands changes of the CDC. The refugee 
community will not continue to expand as it has in years past, meaning that fewer clients will 
need the services offered by the CDC. Additionally, many of the arenas in which the CDC has 
cultivated expertise, from family reunification applications to navigating processes associated 
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with migration, will cease to be relevant as some of the most important functions of the 
organization become targets of policy change.  
There are two possibilities for the future of the CDC. The first is that the CDC adapts to 
the pressures of policy change to continue serving a similar role for the community, mediating 
the relationship between individual refugees and the state. By continuing to position itself as the 
gatekeeper to institutional and procedural knowledge, the vertical relations that link refugees and 
the CDC would be maintained. But this structure does not solve one of the principal challenges 
facing refugees: fragmentation, isolation, and a lack of social bonds. In fact, this vertical 
orientation leads refugees to see the CDC as the extent of the community, rather than as a part of 
a larger community of Congolese peoples. Clement, a male refugee, articulated a common 
response among participants, stating that a community does not exist beyond the walls of the 
CDC. 
When I think of the Congolese community—before, I didn’t know about them. 
When I talk about a Congolese community, I talk about this office. After I came 
here, that’s it. Before, I didn’t know anything. 
 
By maintaining its central position as a point of access for social capital among refugees, 
the CDC becomes a stand-in for the larger community. Prioritizing service delivery results in 
some positive outcomes for refugees, but a potentially myopic focus may ignore other human 
needs that are not addressed. There is a danger that clients of the CDC are defined by the serious 
problems that the organization addresses. In a lecture on asset-based community development, 
Cormac Russell explains the danger of a “client-service” relationship. 
So often when we label people as vulnerable, or as deficient, or as problematic, 
what we actually do is define them out of community, and redefine them, not as 
friend and as neighbor, but as client in a service system. And I think that when we 
do that we take some of the soul away from the person, all in the name of helping 
them. (Russell 2016) 
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Perhaps a better future for refugees would result from re-imagining the role of the CDC. 
If the CDC can decentralize its authority and distribute access more equitably throughout the 
existing Congolese population of the North Shore, it would create conditions more favorable for 
horizontal relations that encourage social bonds among Congolese co-nationals.  
It is important to note that the CDC believes itself to play a central role in re-establishing 
social connections among the community. As Eric noted in his interview, by working on family 
reunification applications, the organization seeks to bring together families and address the 
principal source of loneliness and isolation among refugees. 
Now, some of them people make friends or do not make friends, try to go to 
church, different churches… That does not replace—all of that, you could have 
those single individuals—they could be younger, they could be older, but that 
does not replace the family. We have petitioned for the family to come, and 
maybe the petition is denied, so that is another layer of problem when we see 
what they can do, what else they can do to help with that. 
 
Eric’s response acknowledges the importance of family, but downplays the role of 
friendship, companionship, and social interaction. The CDC, with access to a number of refugees 
that could benefit from interactions with each other, is in the best position to facilitate the 
creation of a strong community. Guided by the tenets of Pan Africanism, this community must 
be grounded in the dignity and solidarity of Black peoples across ethnic, national, and linguistic 
identities. 
But in appearing to place the onus on the CDC to forge community, I want to be careful 
not to replicate the practice of displacing the failures of migration governance and assigning it to 
the community organizations at the bottom of the chain. Community empowerment cannot be 
subsumed by hegemonic narratives that maintain focus on oppressed individuals or communities. 
It should not be incumbent on Black communities to correct the structural inequalities and 
stresses imposed upon refugees.  
   
 
 
 
 
120 
Several changes can be made to the resettlement architecture that would benefit refugees. 
First, changing the financing of resettlement by providing a set amount of funding for refugee 
resettlement would reverse the pressures of competition. Instead of a system that commodifies 
refugees and forces private resettlement agencies to compete for funding, allocating a set amount 
of money for resettlement would shift performance pressures to the state, which would need to 
admit the proper number of refugees to maximize the use of its funding. If the state allocated a 
set amount of funding but failed to resettle the number of refugees accounted for in the budget, 
then the refugees who are admitted would benefit from additional dollars per refugee resettled.  
Second, the metrics of success should shift from state-centered objectives to people-
centered objectives. Metrics tied to employment, self-sufficiency, and consumption of public 
benefits center the priorities of the state at the expense of refugees. Refugee satisfaction, 
happiness, and self-reported success would serve as better metrics for service provision that 
empower individuals. Such a mechanism would account for non-economic measures of well-
being, enabling policymakers and practitioners to focus on the variables that refugees report as 
being most important. 
Third, a commitment should be made to increase funding for grassroots organizations 
that share cultural values with the communities that are served. Funding grassroots community 
organizations to work on cases from the point of arrival would likely result in better outcomes, 
and would prevent some of the failures of culturally incompetent service provision from being 
pushed down the chain. Empowering Black communities and organizations—the vessels of 
African culture in the US—would center Pan Africanism as a solution to the inequalities inherent 
to American society. By restoring the power of African culture and enabling agents to determine 
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their destiny, Black refugee communities could reject the cultural domination that David Ikard 
suggests delegitimizes Black history and ancestry. 
[B]lacks do not seek cultural-specific answers to their social and political queries 
because they have been conditioned to venerate the dominant culture’s notions of 
self and reality and treat their African history and ancestry with suspicion and 
shame. (Ikard 2007: 81) 
 
Pan Africanism can serve as a cultural response to the traumas endured by an exploitative 
resettlement infrastructure while inverting the cultural values of white supremacy. Specific 
reforms of the resettlement architecture, when accompanied by sufficient transparency and 
accountability mechanisms, can alleviate some of the stresses that resettlement inflicts upon 
refugees. Ultimately, though, reformism will not be a sufficient solution to the problems faced by 
refugees. The presumption undergirding this analysis—that the inherently unequal and 
exploitative structures of global neoliberal political economy create the problems that refugees 
face—directs any ultimatum of action towards the redistribution of unequally allocated 
resources. 
The marketization of all aspects of society, which is inherent to the neoliberal project and 
serves as a racialized justification of social inequalities, violently erases the systems of 
exploitation that subjugate those who embody marginalized identities. Black peoples, women, 
and those who cannot access privileges in society are encouraged to solve their own problems in 
bootstrap narratives that place responsibility and blame on the oppressed. Hard work or, in the 
case of RCOs, tactful organization are celebrated as the supposed remedies to marginalization. 
The ideological prevalence of such fallacies obscures the foundations of the problem and 
confounds any attempt at achieving a sustainable solution.  
Margaret Ledwith forcefully asserts the importance of maintaining a critical perspective 
of empowerment, even when conducting an analysis on the level of the community. 
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Empowerment is a transformative concept but without a critical analysis it is all 
too often applied naively to confidence and self-esteem at a personal level, within 
a paradigm of social pathology, a purpose that is usually associated with personal 
responsibility for lifting oneself out of poverty, overlooking structural analyses of 
inequality…. 
 
Empowerment is not the same as self-help: it involves a process of critical 
consciousness as a route to autonomous action but it is not an alternative solution 
to the redistribution of unequally divided resources. (Ledwith 2011: 13, 29) 
 
 It is my hope that this research represents a step towards the critical consciousness 
necessary to envision a society that respects the dignity of refugees, addresses the inequalities 
that are fundamental to our society, and critically examines the racialized hyper-exploitation of 
Black peoples that defines the current phase of global capitalism. True empowerment of the 
Congolese refugee community is incompatible with a society that exploits and limits the 
opportunities of Black peoples. In order to correct the stresses of migration, a fundamental 
restructuring of society must occur. Government must divorce itself from economic forces that 
dictate policy outcomes. Profits cannot be valued more than human lives, and deficits cannot be 
feared more than structural inequalities. Perhaps most importantly, narratives of fear, 
competition, and alterity must be reconciled to erase divisions that create subclasses of humans 
and inflict such severe damage on the human psyche. 
 The Congolese community in the North Shore of Massachusetts captures the effects of 
concentrated neoliberal economic and political philosophies that impose pressures upon 
governments, non-profit organizations, and individuals. The social bonds that enrich human life 
are erased, and individuals struggle to survive. If we are to avoid the social breakdown that 
attends the marketization of all aspects of society, we must learn from the experiences of the 
resettled Congolese refugee community and be motivated to change the foundational features of 
our society that are responsible for the degradation of fundamental human rights. 
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